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Abstract
Massively Multiplayer Online Games have become a popular leisure activ-
ity and big business. They have also become targets for attacks beyond
the personally motivated cheating attempts. The opportunity to make real
money by exploiting these virtual worlds have made security a higher prior-
ity. Combating the security problems of multiplayer games in software alone
is doomed to fail, because the attacker is the player which already controls
the system.
In this thesis, I investigate security problems in massively mulitplayer on-
line games, and how the technologies collectively known as Trusted Com-
puting can be used to combat these problems. To this end, I have created
a new taxonomy, attack-trees and an attack-graph to categories and detail
current security problems. These resources are then used when investigating
the different Trusted Computing technologies. Practical problems with the
use these technologies are identified, and what security problems they can
solve is discussed.
The conclusion is that the classic trusted computing technologies would
solve the major issues, but require changes to common architecture and can
therefore not be implemented by the game developers alone. The newer,
dynamic root of trust based, technologies have great potential as long as the
hardware becomes pervasive and a few underlying problems are solved.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Millions of people currently participate in persistent, online virtual worlds
created by Massivly Multiplayer Online Games (MMOs). These games are
similar to other multiplayer games in that they let players interact, com-
pete and cooperate with each other. But they distinguish themselves with
a huge scale and a persistent virtual world. Some of these games have been
hugely successful in the last decade. Most notably World of Warcraft (WoW)
from Blizzard Entertainment, with, according to themselves, 11.5 million
subscribers in late 2008 [1]. Although it should be noted that these numbers
reflect accounts and not necessarily active players, WoW undoubtedly has a
large user base. Most of these games have virtual economies witch their own
virtual currency. The fact that there are ways to convert virtual currency
and items into real money have helped to make hacking these games not just
a hobby, but very a profitable, yet low risk, activity. Also, games and game
development are often on the cutting edge of technological development and
lessons learned from games security can potentially be applied to other areas
of software as well.
Currently, security problems in these games are recurring and widespread.
There seems to have been a recent increase in studies related to games se-
curity. This is likely due to the increasing popularity of games, and that
security problems have become noticeable to users. Games share most of the
security problems of other types of software and have in addition several game
specific security problems. This includes cheating, which is a serious problem
for many reasons. It can discourage honest players from participating in a
specific game, and potentially make them switch to competing games. Also,
if becoming too widespread, cheating can ruin the virtual worlds, especially
their economies, and cause loss of reputation and revenue. While cheating
is specific to games, it is not surprising that MMOs, being distributed net-
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worked applications, also face more conventional security problems. Just as
cheating, these problems such as information leakage or DOS attacks, can be
means to an end or the end itself. Traditionally, getting an edge in games and
just curious exploration were the main motivations for breaking the security
of games. But with the rise of MMOs, real money can be made through
hacking and tampering with online games 1. In response to the security
threats, developers have taken, sometimes controversial, technical and legal
countermeasures.
Trusted Computing is a class of technologies developed and promoted by
the Trusted Computing Group. One of their goals is to protect the integrity
of client software. The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) was their initial
specification and proposal to strengthen the security of personal computers.
Somewhat controversial, this technology is especially interesting for game
security because it, in a sense, puts some restrictions on the user of the
system.
This thesis centers around MMOs, specially the client-side where most
of the current problems lie. Although the TPM, and Trusted Computing
in general, are purposed as a remedy for cheating and other game security
issues ([2, 3, 4, 5]), there is a lack of investigation into how this should be
done. The goal of this thesis is to determine what, if any, of the technical
security problems facing MMOs can be solved with Trusted Computing. To
do this, a taxonomy of security problems, as well as attack-trees, are created,
and practical use of Trusted Computing technology is investigated.
A brief history and an overview of multiplayer computer games, what they
are and how they work, is given in chapter 2. Chapter 3 analyses security
problems in MMOs, purposes a new taxonomy and attack-trees based on
common motivations. Trusted Computing is explained in chapter 4, and
a possible solutions are discussed. Chapter 5 summarises this thesis and
recommendations for future work are given.
1The same is true for online betting and gambling
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Chapter 2
Background and Motivation
Computer and video games have come a long way since their humble begin-
nings more than fifty years ago. According to the Entertainment Software
Association, computer and video game sales grew to U.S. $11.7 billion in
2008. The numbers are for the U.S. alone, and, presumably, only includes
games sold in stores and not online downloads. They also find that 60% of
American households play these games.[6]
There are many categories of electronic games: computer games, video
console games, arcade games and games played on hand held devices. The
most advanced games can arguably be found in the computer games and
video games categories. Video (console) games are played on special build
video game consoles typically connected to a TV, while computer games are
played on (more or less) standard personal computers.
This thesis focuses on computer games, but there are many similarities,
and the same game is often released for both the PC1 and one or more of the
video game consoles such as the Microsoft Xbox 360 and the Sony Playstation
3.
2.1 Multiplayer Games
The traditional form of video gaming has one player interacting with the com-
puter or gaming-system, often trying to “beat” preprogrammed challenges,
as seen with the arcade games made popular in the late 70’s, and later con-
sole and pc-games. Games also often consist of “AI”2 controlled opponents,
that is, characters in the game that are partly pre-programmed and partly
1Typically Microsoft Windows, but there exists games for other operation systems as
well.
2Artificial Intelligence
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Figure 2.1: Multiplayer games: Past (British Legends) and present (World
of Warcraft). From [7]
respond and react “intelligently”. This form of gaming is often called “single
player” because the gamer does not play with or against other humans, but
is engaged in the game alone.
A more advanced and complex form of games are multiplayer games where
the player is interacting with other players in some way, often in (near) real
time. Multiplayer existed long before the Internet. Arcade games and game
consoles have long supported two or more players, e.g., by dividing (“split-
ting”) the screen or connecting several systems with a dedicated cable. Com-
puter games ran at supercomputers supported several players who connected
using terminals.
But the commonplace of Internet connectivity has contributed to making
multiplayer games more popular by providing the technological basis for sev-
eral types of new multiplayer schemes and new business models for games.
Suddenly it was possible to connect and interact with players “everywhere”.
Although other types of multiplayer games still exist, utilizing the Internet
is the most common way to play with others.
2.2 Massively Multiplayer Online Games
Although there are many different types of multiplayer games, this thesis
focuses on so-called “massively multiplayer online games” (MMOs3).
3or MMOGs
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“Massively multiplayer” means that there is not just a couple, but hun-
dreds, thousands or tens of thousands of players playing together.
One inspiration of the modern MMOs seem to have been the text-only
multiplayer games developed in the late 70’s, called Multi-User Dungeons
(MUDs). These games were small in scale compared to modern MMOs, but
had many of the same traits and operated in a somewhat similar manner.
A MUD typically consisted of a virtual world with many rooms. The player
would connect using a text-only client and get a description of the in-game
surroundings including other players, objects, monsters and non-playable
characters (NPCs). Actions, such as fighting and moving around, could be
performed by typing commands. [7].
Modern MMOs have an entirely different user interface (figure 2.1) and
support more concurrent players, but many of the game mechanics are simi-
lar.
Persistent Worlds The main feature of an MMO, besides the scale, is the
ongoing virtual world where users can create virtual, customizable characters.
These character can resemble the user themselves or something else entirely4.
The virtual and artificial world continues to exist and develop also after the
player has disconnected and is no longer playing his character. The players
who are online inhabit this world and, together with computer-controlled
characters (NPCs) and events, change its state. Players are exploring, fight-
ing and socializing, and since the world is persistent, their achievements the
one day are still there the next.
Role Playing Games Currently the most popular MMOs are role play-
ing games, and thus abbreviated MMORPG. These games are inspired by
traditional role-playing games like Dungeons & Dragons, and let the player
assume a role, a fictional character in the game. This character can develop
as the game progresses, gaining experience, wealth, items, magic spells and
other skills. Building, or leveling up, your character in games like these often
takes considerable time and effort.
Through these kinds of games people can be entertained, and can play
roles that would be impossible to take on in real life.
Some of these games have been hugely successful in the last decade. Most
notably World of Warcraft (WoW) from Blizzard Entertainment, with, ac-
cording to themselves, 11.5 million subscribers in late 2008[1]. Although it
4There are, for example, no reason your character can’t be another gender or another
species
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should be noted that these number reflect accounts and not necessarily active
players, WoW undoubtedly has a large user base.
Virtual Economies Most MMOs have virtual economies witch their own
virtual currency. There are ways to convert virtual currency and items into
real money. If a player wants in-game achievements, such as items, virtual
money, or a character with better abilities, they can buy these from other
players instead of investing the substantial time and effort necessary to gain
them in the game. This has created a market where virtual items and charac-
ters for popular MMOs are bought and sold with real (non-virtual) currency,
mostly US dollars or Euros. Some developers, such as Blizzard, deem such
trade a violation of the EULA5, but it is widespread nonetheless with the
help of third parties. Other developers support this trade with their own vir-
tual currency exchange, while yet others have this as the game’s main source
of income.
2.3 MMO System Architecture and Operation
2.3.1 The Client/Server Architecture
A MUD was typically run on a central server and the players would connect
using modems or a local network. The MUDs were very small by todays
standards, but their architecture has a lot in common with the ones most
used today. Although some peer-to-peer games exist, and this technology
is being researched heavily, the client/server model is still used by the vast
majority of MMOs[7].
In theory the game itself could run on the server, with just the display
and input/output redirected to the client. But in reality most modern games
are resource-intensive and the servers are not powerful enough to run enough
instances of the game. Also, current networks are not fast and reliable enough
to transfer the required amount data in real-time.
The players run a game-client on their computers, where, generally, all
static information such as game-sounds, graphics and other game data is
stored and loaded from. The game-client connects to the server and contin-
uously sends and receives information. Most actions performed by a player
affect other players as well. This includes even simple things such as moving
around in the world since the other players has to see your character moving.
The game-client therefore sends information about the players actions to the
game-server and receives similar information about the other players, as well
5End-user license agreement, typically agreed upon by the user before using the software
8
as other events in the game world. The server is responsible for redistributing
all information to those game-clients who need it. This means that all traffic
flows through, and therefore is controlled by, the game-server.
One thing to note is that most of what the player sees on her screen
is rendered by the game on her local computer and has not traveled the
network.
2.3.2 Handling a Massive Amount of Players
Figure 2.2: Simplified example MMO architecture. Client A and B connect to
game servers through the Internet. On the server-side incoming connections
are load-balanced to all game servers.
The old MUDs were small by todays standards. But they also had to
cope with limited resources, and keeping information about all the players
in the game in memory and exchanging this information proved challenging.
The solution was to split the world into rooms. There where many rooms
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and only those players who where in the same room could affect the room
and each other. This way, each client only has to know and care about the
other players in his current room.
In newer MMOs this concept still applies and is taken a step or two
further. Splitting the world into many “rooms” or areas, and placing each
area on a different server is a method used by the game Everquest as a way
to distribute players and hence resource requirements. When a player travels
to a different area the game-client disconnects from the current server and
connects to the new one. When a player re-joins the game after leaving, the
game server(s) or a separate log-in server remembers the last area the player
visited and tells the game-client what server to connect to [8].
Sharding is another technique where the whole game world is duplicated
and each player is bound to one of the “copies”. This has the advantage that
it’s technically easy to scale up: just add a few servers and populate them
with new players. The downside is that this can be “bad for business” when
friends can not find each other because they are in different copies of the
same game world. It can also be hard to strike a balance between too many
and too few players, as the world has to have enough players to not seem
deserted.
Figure 2.2 shows a simplified example MMO client/server architecture.
Each realm server represents a shard, and each shard has a separate database
cluster, a chat server and several game servers. The clients in Fig. 2.2 are
connected to the same realm and therefore their characters are part of the
same shard. Being part of the same shard, the clients characters are part
of the same virtual world. Players can not easily move their characters to
another shard or interact with players who are connected to different realms,
and thus in other shards. Each client connects to one of the game servers and
to a chat server. In this setup, actions by Client A updates the game server
he is connected to, which in turn updates the databases and the realm server
when appropriate. All this has to happen before those actions are visible to
Client B. [8]
2.3.3 Out of Sync Game State
Unfortunately the Internet is not a perfect and instant communication chan-
nel. By the time the updates from one client reaches the other clients, the
information will already be outdated.
In a perfect world the game-client would send an update for every event,
but in practice bandwidth is limited, and updates will only be sent a fixed
number of times pr. second.
These properties leads to clients who are out of sync; they do not have
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the same view of the game world at any given time. When a central server
is used it is often authoritative in the sense that whatever view it has on the
game world and state is the correct one, and the clients have to adjust.
As long as the delay, or lag, in communication is small the game will
provide a suitable workaround.
To counter the problem with infrequent updates, the game-client will
make educated guesses as to where someone or something is located at any
given time. It will look at the last update and try to calculate what has
happened since then. Unfortunately this can be abused, for example, by
purposely delaying outgoing updates. The lack of authoritative updates will
force the others to guess more, and the cheater can wait to the others have
made their move and then react accordingly [9]. In a client/server setup the
server can be the authority.
When packets, and thus commands, arrive delayed or out-of-order, the
server can look at a time-stamp in the packets to determine the real order
of the actions. This, however, requires a global clock and trust in the game-
client to time-stamp its packages correctly, i.e., not lie.
2.4 Why Games?
2.4.1 Big Business, Real Money
As the popularity of massively multiplayer games has risen the last decades
and gaming has become a significant industry, security has become more and
more important. With so much effort and money invested in developing and
maintaining games the developer has much at stake. And the users, many
spending countless hours building their characters in these games, and often
a lot of money too, suffer if what they have worked so hard for is lost.
It seems like the issue of illegal copying often get more attention than
security, but security flaws can ruin the game in many ways.
Because online games can represent value they also provide a greater
incentive for players to cheat and for attackers and criminals to exploit games
for profit.
The security firm Eset note that “While there have always been unpleasant
people who will steal another gamer’s credentials just for the heck of it, trading
in virtual cash, treasure, avatars and so on is now a major source of illegal
income for cybercriminals” [10].
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Figure 2.3: The total number of active subscriptions in MMOs. From
mmochart.com (http://www.mmogchart.com/Chart4.html)
2.4.2 Complex and Distributed
For many years computer games have been some of the most complex and
demanding programs to be run on personal computers, always demanding
the newest and greatest equipment to deliver the best experience.
A culture where new “features” and better graphics are more important
than stability and bug-free programs have helped the developers push the
limits of what is technically possible. Multiplayer games have the added
complexity of sharing a virtual world between all the players in real time.
The type of online games this thesis focuses on is characterised by being
massively distributed. This, of course, does not make them any simpler. The
“state” of the virtual world is everything that is dynamically changing. Data
about in-game characters, player controlled and those controlled by the game
itself (NPCs), is an example of information that depends on the actions of
the players. All the data that do not change, such as graphics and sound
data, are not shared in real time. The dynamic game world state however,
has to be shared between thousands of players. Each game-client does not
have to be informed about everything that goes on in the world, only the
12
pieces that affect it.
2.4.3 A Look Into the Future?
This is a type of massively distributed system not seen in too many other
“real life” systems today. Not many other systems can make the claim that
they connect millions of people together in complex, real time environments.
The massively distributed model might become more popular in the fu-
ture. Therefore MMOs can be a testing ground: what we learn here (what
works/does not work, mistakes etc.) can be deployed in future systems.
Many people believe the future of computing will be more distributed,
and right now there is nothing more distributed than MMOs.
2.4.4 New Threat
Game security is a fairly new topic. Although games and online games have
been around for some time, the security of the games was for a while a
problem only concerning the players and the developers.
Now that games have become more popular and even more complex, the
topic has gained some academic interest, but it can still be seen as a new
topic with a lot of unexplored territory and research to be done.
13
14
Chapter 3
Security Problems in Games
The security problems related to MMOs, and games in general, are many
and diverse. This chapter gives a state of the art overview of these problems
based on current literature, as well as attack-trees and a taxonomy.
3.1 Reasons to Cheat or Hack Multiplayer Games
Peoples’ motivation for cheating or otherwise break the security of multi-
player games are of course many and different. This is a list of some com-
mon motivations, and some examples of how people can, and do, break the
security for their own gain. This list is not supposed to be exhaustive, but
shows some common scenarios and how the technical means given later in
this chapter can be used in practice.
This section refers to the taxonomy in section 3.2.3 and the complete
attack graph described in section 3.8 (fig. 3.5).
3.1.1 Win the Game, Defeat Others
People like to win, so performing well in a game is a classical reason to cheat.
There are still people cheating in games just for the sake of winning. In
addition to feeling superior, cheating can help advance the player in a game
where he is not otherwise skilled or patient enough to do so. While cheating
improves the players performance, there is also another, less common way to
get ahead: destroy the others.
Cheating
Cheating is the most common security problem in games today. When games
are single-player only, cheating does not pose a problem as players choosing
15
Win the Game / Defeat Others
Cheat Attack other players
Modify
software
Exploit
server
architecture
Exploit
game rules
Automate
play
Exploit server-side
vulnerability
in sw/hw
Exploit
ingame bugs DOS
In-game
(Grief)
Impersonate
and harm
Figure 3.1: Attack-tree for “Win the game, defeat others”
to cheat do not affect others. Cheating in single-player games have a long
history, and typically a game would respond to cheat codes that the player
could enter to gain in-game items, health etc. Unlike most other types of
cheating, cheat codes are created and implemented by the game developer.
Another classic type of cheating is to modify saved games. Often single-
player games will allow a player to save his or her progression in the game.
Typically this will be saved in a separate file, and modifying this file can
give the player a different starting point when returning to the game. It is
debatable if this is actually cheating. Since the player is not deceiving anyone
this can be looked at as playing the game with an alternate set of rules [11,
Ch.12].
In multiplayer games cheating is not so innocent, since cheating, either
directly or indirectly, affects other players. By cheating a player can gain
advantages in-game and become harder or impossible to beat for the other
players. Therefore cheating in multiplayer games are not supported by the
game developer, and can ruin the game for honest players. Since cheats are
not “built into” most MMOs, the cheater has to find other means of cheating.
Cheating is further defined in section 3.2.2.
Attacking Others
Attacking other players is an alternative to cheating for getting ahead in
the game. Denial of Service attacks (DOS, section 3.1.3) can be used to
disconnect or shut other players out of the game, thereby increasing the
attackers chances. Griefing (section 3.1.3) can be used to distract other
players and hamper their play. Impersonation can be used as a DOS tactic,
for example by closing other peoples accounts. Given the persistent world of
most MMOs, it can also be used to ruin other players characters, e.g., giving
away their virtual items, or to lower score or rank with abysmal play.
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3.1.2 Learning and Exploration
Exploration (curiosity, boredom)
Explore / hack the game-client Explore the game
Reverse engineer game-client Observe / modify game-clientat runtime Cheat to reach new levels
Figure 3.2: Attack-tree for “Learn / Explore”
Curiosity can lead technical savvy gamers to explore and modify their
game-client (2b), look for vulnerabilities in the game (4) or the server-side
implementation (1b). The motivation can be the challenge it is to break the
system or an interest to learn how the game works. Also, players may wish
to explore the game world itself, and cheating can be a way to advance in
games which would otherwise be too difficult or demand too much effort.
Generally, this type of game hacking should be rather harmless, at least
until the gamer realizes the value of his discoveries.
3.1.3 Attack Vendor or Other Players (Malice)
Some people seem inclined to ruin an experience for others, and the (per-
ceived) anonymity of online games often creates opportunities to do so.
Denial Of Service (DOS)
Denial Of Service (DOS) are a non-technical group of attacks where the goal
simply is to deny a service, in our example typically the game itself, to others.
DOS breaks the availability and can be both a goal in itself or means to an
end. As a means to an end such as cheating, DOS can be especially effective
when combined with other type of attacks and used at the right moment.
An example would be to disconnect a player who is about to win a game or
fight.
On the network level Denying service to others can be done in many
different ways, and without targeting the network per se. However, flooding
17
Attack Vendor / Attack Other Players (Malice)
Attack other players Attack servers or infrastructure
DOSImpersonate and harm In-game (Grief)
Exploit server-side
vulnerability
in sw/hw
Figure 3.3: Attack-tree for “Attack Vendor or other players”
a host or network with traffic is a classical way to disrupt network applications
such as multiplayer games (3b, 3c). By flooding the server or other players’
systems it is possible to slow them down or disconnect them entirely. The
traffic can be engineered to blend in with other traffic so it is hard to detect, to
use specially crafted packets to consume resources at the receivers (network
level such as TCP SYN flood or application level) and come from many
senders at once (DDOS).
DOS on the network level can also be done by delaying or suppressing
traffic (3a iv).
Other types Generally, some DOS attacks misuse security functions in
place to lock out attackers. A non-network DOS attack is account-lockout.
By abusing the procedures in place to stop brute force guessing of passwords,
an attacker can lock out legitimate players by constantly trying to log-in with
their username and an incorrect password.
Griefing
Griefing, as in causing grief, is the intentional harassment of other players in
multiplayer games. The goal is not to deny service but to degrade the experi-
ence for others. The term is used for in-game actions such as attacking one’s
own teammates or hinder their movement, accusing others of wrongdoing or
“stealing” items and experience gained by other players. Abusing the chat
function (spamming) can also be griefing.
Griefing is a non-technical term, thus it does not fit well into the technical
taxonomy.
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3.1.4 Earn Money
Earn money
Sell
virtual
items
Sell
(high level)
accounts
Sell
players
personal info.
Develop
and sell
cheating
programs
Promote other
services/products
(spam)
Launder
money
through
MMOs
Use
in-game
mafia tactics
Acquire through cheating Steal accounts Sniffnetwork traffic Acquire in-game
Figure 3.4: Attack-tree for “Earn Money”
In MMOs this is potentially the most important factor, as there are many
ways to make money by hacking these games.
The most obvious one might be to cheat in games where real money can
be made from virtual items. The cheater gains virtual items faster than other
players and these items can then be sold to players who would rather spend
some money than the required time and effort to advance in a game.
Personal Information
Personal information is valuable, especially credit card information. If an
attacker can steal account information or otherwise hijack accounts (section
3.1.4, account stealing), the players information might be available. In some
games personal information can even travel the network unencrypted and is
therefore vulnerable to network sniffing (3ai). Encryption does not necessar-
ily help if it is implemented naively, for example, with a static key shared
by all game-clients. As with account stealing, this information can also be
gathered by exploiting vulnerabilities on the server or in the game-client (1a,
2a), with malware on the client-side (uses 2b), or with non-technical means
such as social engineering and phishing.
Games as Communication Channel
Games with a large amount of players and well developed means of commu-
nication can find themselves a target for in-game advertisement, i.e., spam.
In World of Warcraft for example, spam is a frequent problem in areas, such
as the cities, where many people gather. Using the in-game message system
is one way, but other, more creative “solutions” also exist. At the time of
writing, a popular method seems to be to suicide many characters in such a
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way that the bodies spell URLs on the ground. In-game communication is a
big part of many online games, so simply disabling it is often not an option.
Spam will probably continue to be a big problem for many games, since they
provide a relative easy, cheap and risk-free way of reaching many people.
Virtual Assets
A new dimension of MMOs not present in most other games is the connection
between virtual value and real life value. Most games only last for a couple
of hours or less, but most MMOs are set in a persistent virtual world. This
means that achievements stay with a players’ character and the character
itself improves over time (section 2.2). There is currently money to be made
in popular MMOs by selling virtual items, property and characters (section
2.2). This, of course, is a major incentive to cheat or hack these games,
since simply playing them normally does not give a good return on the time
invested.
Cheat in the Game
By cheating a player can advance in the game, and hence gather virtual
assets, quicker. By automating the playing of the game (2c, 2d) a cheater can
gather virtual assets without playing. But fully automated gaming, that is a
computer program that can play the game without intervention, is difficult
to achieve in MMOs because of the complexity of the gameplay. Even so,
oﬄoading some of the “work” to the computer can help the player be more
efficient, for example by playing many characters at once. Also, games are
sometimes played for money, for example a tournament with a cash prize.
See also section 3.1.1.
Exploit Flaws in the Game or on the Server
Exploiting bugs and vulnerabilities in the game can also help to gather assets,
and sometimes serious flaws in the game architecture or implementation can
make it possible to duplicate virtual items. Reportedly, a man in Canada
was able to make U.S. $700,000 by duplicating items in Star Wars Galaxies,
a Star Wars themed MMO [12, Ch.1].
Steal Virtual Items, Characters etc.
While exploiting flaws in the game, or otherwise cheat, can help to gather
assets quicker, simply stealing such assets can be even more efficient. In
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MMOs, virtual items are typically bound to a character, and the character
is bound to an account.
Account stealing Often the only authentication is a username / password
combination, which is validated on the server-side. One way to steal valid
accounts is to guess (brute force or manually) this combination (1d, 1e). This
information can also be stolen in many ways, such as phishing, malware (2a,
2b), network sniffing (3ai) and fake servers (3d).
Account stealing has become a major problem in WoW. So much so that
the developer, Blizzard, are now selling a hardware token (“authenticator”)
that enables two-factor authentication, but it is optional [13]. If used by the
player the username/password combinations is no longer enough to authen-
ticate him, and thus guessing or stealing this becomes less valuable.
According to the security company Eset “There has been a spectacular
increase of malware designed to trick the user into parting with sensitive
gaming-related information” [14]. They also list a trojan designed to steal
game-related information as the third most serious threat of 2009 [10]. While
the authenticator solves some of the problems, such as attackers sniffing the
information on the wire, other problems persist, such as different forms of
man-in-the-middle attacks. Recently, a malware surfaced attacking the WoW
authenticator by hijacking the log-in process [15].
Develop and Sell Cheat Programs
Developing and selling cheat programs can be another way to make money,
as there already seems to be a market for such programs in many popular
MMOs. Players who use such cheats may run the risk of being banned form
the game, and the developer of the cheat programs might be sued by the
game developers.
In 2006 WoW developer Blizzard and the creators of the Glider bot soft-
ware began a court feud in the United Sates. Glider is a program that lets
WoW players automate playing of the game (section 3.5.4) and had sold
100,000 copies as of 2008 [16]. Blizzard seems to have won the first round,
but an appeal is pending [17][18]1.
1One of Blizzards arguments was that Glider facilitates copyright infringement, even
though cheating and illegal copying are unrelated. The “illegal copying” supposedly hap-
pened when the legal copy of the game was loaded into RAM at runtime. As the Glider
user breached the EULA, he or she did not have the “right” to “copy” the game. One
would think the fact that this “running is copying” argument held up in court, together
with ever-changing EULA’s, would have American software consumers running for the
hills.
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Still, several such cheating programs are readably available2.
In-game Blackmail and Other Mafia Tactics
There might be an untapped potential for criminal activity in online games
as real money stands to be made and the risk is negligible. By hijacking
accounts it could be possible to dominate virtual worlds such as MMOs by
means similar to those used by organized crime in the real world. In-game
blackmail can be possible because there are ways to ruin the experience for
a user, take away their character and their income. Although this might
not sound so serious, it depends on how involved the user is in the game.
Some people will invest a lot of time and money in a MMO, for example have
many WoW players been building their in-game characters since the game
was released in 2004. The more involved users are, the more difficult it is for
them to just walk away, and the more they have to lose by not complying
with threats. Other possibilities include pay for protection schemes like the
ones operated by the mafia, and the more legit bodyguard counterparts. If
there are no enemies, create them. Forcing individuals or groups of players
(guilds) to pay a small fee for their “right” to inhabit and move freely in the
virtual world seems possible. Similarly, plain extortion is possible as long as
the victim has something to lose. Or, one could offer services like guns for
hire and hitmen to help defeating enemies and completing in-game missions.
There are already reports of services like bodyguarding and possibly even
“guns” for hire being offered [19].
Low Risk Low risk is one advantage of committing crime in a virtual world.
This has many reasons. For one the virtual identity is not really bound to
a person’s real identity and thus it is easier to keep them separate and the
actual person out of reach of real world law enforcement. In a virtual world
it is also easy to operate across borders making it even more difficult to track
down and convict perpetrators. Also, a lot of what would be deemed illegal
in the real world is not necessarily illegal in the virtual. So far, policing in
the virtual worlds are done by the developers themselves and they, of course,
have limited powers in the real world. While spreading malware might be
illegal, malware is already commonplace and the prisons are not filled with
those perpetrators. Actual governmental control in virtual worlds seems non-
existent. [20]
2For example http://www.mmoninja.com and http://www.mmomimic.com
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Launder Money
The lack of control over and regulations in virtual economies can be exploited
by real world criminals in an effort to hide the real origin of money and make
then untraceable to the authorities. Money is introduced into the virtual
world by, e.g., buying characters, gold or other virtual items. The money can
be retrieved by selling off these virtual items. By taking advantage of many,
possibly hijacked, accounts each amount transfered can be small to further
hinder detection, a classic trick used in money laundering. A procedure for
automating this would be necessary to do this on a large scale. Money is
made by providing this service to real life criminals and others who need to
conceal the origin or destination of assets. [20] [21]
3.2 Classifying Problems
Security problems in MMOs is a broad topic, and it is not self-evident how
they should be classified. An overview and classification is useful for seeing
the “big picture”, and as a reference when discussing these security problems
and solutions.
3.2.1 Existing Taxonomies
There have been some related work in classifying security issues in games,
but most are limited to cheating and does not include other problems. The
amount of different taxonomies can be seen as an indication to the problem
of classifying different cheats into neatly organized categories.
In [22] and [23] Yan and Randell creates a three-dimensional taxonomy
of cheating in online games, and classify cheating into 15 categories. These
categories are not disjoint, do not include other security problems affecting
games and are not technical enough to fit the purpose of this thesis. They find
that the traditional security aspects: confidentiality, integrity, availability
and authenticity are insufficient for categorizing cheating, and therefore add
fairness as a fifth to contain basically everything that does not fit into the
others. It is difficult to categorize cheating based on these aspects. Most
vulnerabilities can lead to consequences that fall into many or all of these
categories, depending on the viewpoint. Also, one can argue that “fairness”
is always breached, since cheating, by definition, is unfair.
Webb and Soh build on previous work by GauthierDickey et al. ([24]) and
classify cheats into game, application, protocol and infrastructure categories.
They purposely leave out classes of problems they feel are general security
problems and not directly game related. Also, their focus is on the difference
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between peer-to-peer and client/server architectures, and their infrastructure
category lumps together everything outside of the game itself. [25]
Yee et al. [26] focus on MMOs in Asia and do a threat analysis by
identifying threats and creating an attack-tree. They identify the following
five threats:
1. Gain illegal access to play the game
2. Cheat at game play
3. Disrupt game play
4. Cheat at paying for game play
5. Steal proprietary parts of the software
1 and 4 are basically the same thing and covered as one item in the
following list. 2 and 3 are especially interesting due to their highly technical
nature. 5 is somewhat interesting, but not game specific. They also create a
weighted attack-tree, but it is unclear what they base these values on.
Other taxonomies are the one created by Matthew Pritchard [27] and the
one created by Yan and Choi [28] as used in Cheating in Online Games -
Threats and Solutions by Mørch [29].
The one used later in this chapter concentrates on technical problems, i.e.,
it does not include social problems such as insider attacks, social engineering,
virtual trade fraud and gold purchase. It is inspired by Hoglund and McGraw
[12, Ch.6]. Also, I presume that the server is fair and trusted by all parties.
3.2.2 Cheating vs. Non-cheating
One way to classify the different security problems is to divide them into
cheating and non-cheating, and thus cheating becomes a subset of the security
problems in games.
There is no formal way of defining cheating and several papers come up
with their own definition, many of which become quite complicated.
Yan and Randell define cheating as
Any behavior that a player uses to gain an advantage over his
peer players or achieve a target in an online game is cheating
if, according to the game rules or at the discretion of the game
operator (that is, the game service provider, who is not necessarily
the developer of the game), the advantage or the target is one that
the player is not supposed to have achieved. [22]
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A simpler solution is to simply define cheating as unfair advantage, such
as this definition from Webb and Soh:
We define cheating as a user action that gives an advantage over
his/her opponents that is considered unfair by the game developer
[25]
Of course this begs the question: what is unfair? There is no general answer
that will cover all games. Behaviour that is considered fair and allowed in one
game and community can be regarded as cheating in another. The definition
of fair can even be different between players of the same game.
Here I’ll use yet another definition, and claim that the difference between
cheating and other security related problems is not a technical one. The
techniques used can be the same, but the expected outcome determines if
something should be regarded as cheating. Therefore I define cheating as
“Actions taken to get an unfair in-game advantage” . By this definition, it
would be cheating to exploit a bug in the server software to benefit within the
game, but not cheating to exploit the same bug to steal personal information
or blackmail the company.
Since this is a non-technical way of classifying the problems it is less
interesting for this thesis, since the technical methods and shortcomings are
the real issue here, and the intended outcome is less relevant. Often the same
technical aspects can be exploited both for cheating, and otherwise break the
security, in online games.
This definitions might not be perfect since it portrays even social engi-
neering as cheating if the goal is an in-game advantage.
3.2.3 Classification Based on Target
Another way to classify problems is to divide them into groups based on
where the problem technically lies, or, in other words, what is being attacked.
This is a list of low-level technical means, that can be used as a foundation
for describing cheating and other security problems in online games. Some
items can fit many places and are placed somewhat arbitrary.
1. Server-side
(a) Exploit software bugs and vulnerabilities
i. In common software such as un-patched operating systems
and services
ii. In custom software such as the game-server software itself or
software handling log-in
25
(b) Attack game-specific architecture flaws such as failure in synchro-
nisation between different parts of the system
(c) Exploit Hardware vulnerabilities
(d) Guess usernames and passwords
(e) Abuse “forgotten password” functions
2. Client-side
(a) Exploit software bugs and vulnerabilities
i. In common software the game relies on
ii. In custom software such as the game-client itself or included
libraries
(b) Software modification
i. Before execution
A. Reverse engineer game-client software
B. Modify software, such as the game-client executable, op-
erating system or drivers, on disk
ii. During execution
A. Read or alter memory
B. Inject DLL’s
C. Hook Windows userland functions
D. Hook Windows kernel functions
(c) Mimicking userinput in software (botting, use on of the above
methods)
(d) Mimicking userinput using hardware
(e) Hardware attacks
i. Read memory
A. Using DMA
B. Other hardware modifications
ii. Sniff bus
3. Network traffic
(a) Proxy / Man in the middle
i. Observe traffic
ii. Modify traffic
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iii. Generate, insert or replay traffic
iv. Delay or suppress traffic
(b) Flood or otherwise disrupt the players traffic
(c) Flood or otherwise disrupt server traffic
(d) Fake decoy server
4. Rules of the game (the game itself)
(a) Collusion
(b) Score hacking
(c) Game bugs and design flaws
3.3 “Games are software too”
Underlying many of the technical attack vectors is the fact that “games are
software too” as Hoglund and McGraw note [12]. Therefore the problems
seen in other applications often apply to games as well. This includes things
like faults in the implementation (software bugs) and faults in the software
design (software flaws).
Although these are common problems, some factors can intensify security
problems in games. Examples are the complexity of modern MMOs (both
architecture and the software itself), pressure to meet release dates, hight
tolerance among the users for buggy and incomplete software (games are
often patched to weed out problems after the release, and gamers know this).
Also, security is not always considered high priority, but I suspect this is
quite common.
Many programs in common use have a long history of, more or less,
serious security flaws. This goes a long way to prove the often sited theory
that no software is perfect. Even seemingly simple client/server programs,
for example HTTP servers, often have a long history of flaws and this does
not look too promising for games, which are much more complex and less
transparent than most software.
There are also many problems unique to games, and those are, at least for
this thesis, the most interesting. This thesis focuses less on general security
problems in software and more on specific security problems that are relevant
for games.
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3.4 Server-side Problems
As mentioned, MMOs are often client/server applications. The servers and
supporting architecture are running on a trusted system controlled by the
game operator or a business partner.
3.4.1 Software Attacks (1a, 1b)
The game servers will typically run both custom game software and common
proprietary and open source software. As discussed in section 3.3, complex
software is seldom bug free. This class of problems is quite broad and include
flaws in the code, flaws in the design and configuration errors. A security
breach in the one or more applications running on the servers could lead
to modifications of the virtual world, or even full takeover, by a malicious
party. An example would be user-input not sanitized correctly leading to
SQL injection attacks. Such attacks could of course ruin the database, which
would be bad enough, but they could also be used to change something or
someone in the virtual world to give the attacker an advantage in-game. But
malicious users also take advantage and try to blackmail the game operators.
3.4.2 Hardware Attacks (1c)
Although possible, attacks on the hardware running the server-side game
architecture is probably unlikely as it would take considerable insider knowl-
edge to succeed. Examples of this are flaws in different hardware components
such as network equipment (routers, firewalls etc.). There are examples of
hardware being vulnerable because of mis-configuration, firmware bugs or
broken crypto.
3.4.3 Architecture / System Implementation Attacks
(1c)
In big games the serverside architecture and the game itself can be quite com-
plex. When the state of the virtual world have to be shared among many
servers, inconsistencies can creep in. This is due to the “lag” in communica-
tions between servers and the time it takes to actually process the information
from other servers. The inconsistency can sometimes be exploited, and it’s
not feasible to test every possible actions and conditions in complex games.
One very simple example works like this: Player A wants to give an item to
player B. If this action is implemented naively as a non-atomic copy + delete,
the player could try to interrupt the delete, for example by disconnecting.
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If successful, the result would be a duplication of the item. Since virtual
items can be sold or otherwise converted into real money in many MMOs,
the ability to duplicate virtual items is a virtual money press.
3.5 Client-side Problems
Achieving security on the client-side of games is even more daunting than on
the server-side. Typically in MMOs the player will run an advanced game-
client on his machine, which will connect to the server when playing.
For the purpose of preventing tampering with the client, the user must
be considered as the enemy, which means the game-client runs in a possibly
hostile environment. Normally, the user has full control over, and access to,
his or her own system, while the game only has the level of access granted
to it by the user. The game can require high access, such as administrator
rights on Windows systems, but it’s hard to tell if it has direct control or,
for example, is running within a virtual machine.
In most other scenarios concerning security the resource owner applies se-
curity mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access, as it is in the best interest
of the user to protect his or her own system. It’s then up to the attacker to
find a crack in the system or the defence, such as a software flaw, a config-
uration error or a flaw in the design. Unfortunately this has proven to be
difficult at times. A case in point is the still widespread existence of viruses
and other malware after fighting them for decades. Still, the owner of the
system in question does not want malware. But when we put the client part
of our game on the users computer, he is already controlling it. As such,
stopping, or even detecting, unwanted actions or modifications to the system
of the game-client becomes difficult.
This is a fundamental problem in game-client security, and one that is
not shared by too many other scenarios. A quite similar problem in many
ways is the problem attempted to be solved with content protection, such
as copy protection and Digital Rights Management (DRM). With DRM the
publishers of licensed digital content, such as music and e-books, try to en-
force specific use of the content. The user might for example be authorized
to playback a song but not copy or transfer it to another machine or medium.
The similarity is that the goal in all of these cases is to give the user some
access to the content, but still keep some control. With game-clients it might,
depending on the design, be ideal to limit what the users can do with the
game-client in order to secure the game. This form of access control is dif-
ficult because the user has to be able to, e.g., play the music, but not copy
it to another device. Encryption alone does not solve this problem since
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the user has to be able to decrypt the content to be able to use it, and the
unencrypted content can then be copied freely.
Regarding the client-side, Hoglund and McGraw [12, ch.6] define four
types of attack against MMOs and online games in general:
• Controlling the user interface, or “going over the game”
• Modifying the game, either in memory or on disk, or “getting in the
game”
• Using the layer below e.g. drivers, or “getting under the game”
• Modifying or generating network traffic, or “standing way outside the
game”. This can be seen as a client-side problem or a problem of its
own, and is covered in 3.6.
3.5.1 Controlling the User Interface (2b, 2c, 2d)
Players control the game through the user interface, typically consisting of a
mouse, a keyboard and a monitor. Mimicking user input can be done with
either hardware external to the computer or in software. Using hardware
it is possible to, e.g., press keys on the keyboard or send signals normally
generated by the input devices directly to the input port. Although this is
hard to detect if done with hardware, it is more common to do this in software
as it is much easier to implement and control. The operating systems own
API calls can be used to supply “userinput” to the game-client.
The goal when controlling the user interface is to oﬄoad some tiresome,
repetitive human tasks, or even facilitate fully automated play. This is dis-
cussed in 3.5.4.
3.5.2 Modifying the Game in Memory or on Disk (2bi,
2biiA, 2biiB)
Even online games that connect to a server have to store a lot of game state
locally on the client, since transferring all necessary data in real time is not
technologically possible. Whatever is stored locally of game code and data,
is under the players control. This code and data can be reverse engineered
and modified before or after the game is launched. Since the game-client is
such a big piece of the overall game, modifying it can change how the game
behaves for the attacker.
By reading from memory when the game is running, it is often possible to
“see” things the game-client has to know but is hiding from the player. One
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example of changing data is to modify your own location in the 3D world,
effectively “teleporting” the game character to anywhere in an instant. Unless
the server double-checks the client input that is. Assuming it is not possible
to move across the 3D world in an instant 3 “teleporting” the character breaks
the rules of the gameworld by moving faster than possible. If the server does
even the most basic sanity checking on the input it receives from the client,
it will detect that this input can not be correct.
3.5.3 Using the Layer Below (2biB, 2biiC, 2biiD)
Like most software, games clients relies on utilizing functionality from the
operation system. This makes it possible to fool the game without modifying
the game itself, e.g. by letting it load a custom driver. One example of this is
the infamous wallhack in first person shooter games where the display driver
is modified to make the walls in the 3D world transparent, revealing other
players that are suppose to be hidden. 4
3.5.4 Automated Play / Botting (2c, 2d, 3aiii)
One goal of some of these client-side “attacks” is to be able to automate
playing of the game, also called botting. Being able to play more or less
automatically has several advantages. Some times the computer can do a
better job at playing the game than any human, giving the user a huge
advantage if some or all the playing is “oﬄoaded” to the computer. The
most common example of this is probably auto-aiming in shooting games,
where the player does not aim for himself like he is suppose to, but lets some
software do the job for him. This is clearly cheating, as the player gains an
unfair advantage, and aiming is part of the game. Computers excel at many
different “skills”, and whenever one of those are involved in the gameplay,
there is a possibility for cheating by letting the computer (software) play
parts of the game.
Many MMOs, especially role playing games, have persistent and evolv-
ing characters. By playing the game and e.g. do missions or kill enemies
the player (or the players character) is rewarded with in-game experience,
currency or items. This currency, like in-game money, gold or items have an
actual real life value. Therefore it is possible to play a game and later sell the
virtual assets. The only problem is that by playing normally one would not
earn very much per hour this way, even when exploiting the fact that some
3It could be, e.g. with a spell of some sort
4There are other ways to achieve similar results, see [30] for an overview
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countries have lover average income than others. By more or less automate
the playing, one person can play many more characters in the game at once,
effectively multiplying his income. The “holy grail” is of course to totally au-
tomate the playing, effectively earning money without lifting a finger. This
type of botting is also regarded as cheating, and steps may be taken by the
game developer to detect and deter automated play. Even so, it still remains
a problem.
Technically, botting can be achieved by many means
• Modifying the game itself to automate some operations (2bi, 2biiB).
• Mimic user input (2c, 2d), possibly with feedback from the internal
game state or information displayed on the screen. Internal state such
as variables can be gathered by modifying the game (2biB), read id
from memory at runtime (2biiA) or inject DLLs into the game to run
custom code (2biiB). Information displayed on the screen can be such
things as the players health or items and spells etc. For most automated
playing to be effective feedback is needed. A simple example is a fighter
bot that will try to automatically kill non-player characters in a MMO
to gain experience, items and money (gold) for the player. Such a bot
would, for example, need to know when to attack and when to run
away, so monitoring the players (its own) health is crucial.
• Capturing and replaying network traffic to repeat one or more in-game
actions, see 3.6.
3.5.5 Combating Client-Side Issues
Solutions currently applied by the game-developers to combat client-side se-
curity issues mainly fall into two categories: software obfuscation on the
client-side and server-side checking of players action and input from the client.
These solutions can be, and often are, combined.
Software Hashing and Signature Based Scanning
One approach to try to stop players from cheating is to use signatures to
look for known cheating software on the client. The idea is that if cheats
become widespread, and thus a problem, the client can be updated with a
signature to match the cheat-code. Valve Anti-Cheat included in games from
Valve Corporation uses this approach. Valve games can also hash parts of
(or all off?) the game-client, including data files such as sounds, to detect
modifications [31].
32
World Of Warcraft includes a disputed program called the Warden which
looks for suspicious programs running on the system. It will compare the
window title text and some of the code found in programs running with
known values from programs deemed illegal by Blizzard, and also send data
back to the servers [12].
The main problem with this approach, other than the invasion of privacy,
is that the controlling mechanism runs on the same system as the game and
therefore is just as prone to being subverted or modified as the game itself.
The server can try to check if the security program is running, but not really
know if the answers it is getting are from the actual anti-cheat program, or
a fake one. And if it was possible to secure programs running on the client,
the anti-cheat program would not be necessary in the first place.
Software Obfuscation
In order to stop reverse-engineering and the modification of software various
software obfuscation techniques have been developed. These techniques can
be used to secure the game-client itself or a smaller, possibly separate, anti-
cheat program. Such techniques usually involve runtime decryption and de-
obfuscation, as well as code to try to stop runtime debugging, analysis and
modification. Such techniques can be successful in raising the bar for software
modification and are often used in DRM and to hamper reverse-engineering
of proprietary applications. The downside is that the extra complexity can
add new bugs and make debugging the applications difficult. Also it quickly
becomes an arms race, and the computer has to be able to execute the
program at some point.
There has been some interesting research regarding obfuscation of games
such as [32] and [33]. The methods they describe makes it difficult to modify
the running software by getting updates from the server and modifying itself.
Unfortunately, none of these methods have seemingly been implemented in
a complex application, and it would be difficult to do so.
Serverside Checking
In most client/server setups all communication travels through the server
and the server is authoritative. Preferably the server should never trust the
client, and thus place all security sensitive code on the server and control
and sanitize all input from clients. In practice this is often difficult to do,
and security alone does not dictate the development.
The server should check the input from the client to see if it is legal, that
is, possible according to the rules of the game. In the large virtual worlds of
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many MMOs moving from on side of the world to the other can be a chore,
hence the popularity of “teleport” cheats that enable the player to move any-
where in an instant. See 3.5.2. Since the server is responsible for informing
the client about the (virtual) world around him, such as where other players
and non-player characters are, it knows where the player is. It should there-
fore be simple to detect “teleport” cheats at the server when the game-client
suddenly sends a new position far away from the old one. Whenever the
game-client flamboyantly breaks the rules of the game - teleporting is just
one example - it should be detectable on the server.
Not all cheating is so obvious. If the game-client claims the in-game char-
acter is moving at ten times the maximum in-game travel speed, it is clearly
lying. But to determine the exact characteristics of an in-game character at
any given time takes a lot more work. In MMOs, and other types of games as
well, these characteristics are often variable and change as the game progress.
The server, in theory, does have all the information it needs to “rewind”
the state of the gameworld to a given time and rerun the operation done at
the client. If the results differ from what the client reported, something is
amiss.
The main problem with this solution is that advanced checking is very
resource intensive. So even if designing elaborate checks on the server is
possible, running these checks for each client might not be. Constantly sim-
ulating all the clients on the server is not feasible. Also, it will not detect all
cheating or fix all security problems such as more passive problems such as
information disclosure.
Two possible solutions to this arise. First, there’s no need to check all the
clients results all the time. Random checks should be enough to eventually
catch cheaters. If one random check returns inconclusive results the server
can start paying more attention to that particular client. Secondly, it might
be possible to oﬄoad some or most of this work to other clients. Assuming
the other clients are unmodified they will do the servers bidding. Even if
some clients are modified and collude with the cheater (or just skips the
check to save some CPU time), cheating will be caught eventually, as long
as the majority of the players are honest.
3.6 Network Traffic
Network traffic attacks have primarily been used by players against the com-
munication between the server and their own client. But, if a player is able
to gain access to other players network traffic, these kinds of attacks could
be used against other players as well. The same type of modifications that
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can be used to help one player, can be used to hurt another.
3.6.1 Generating or Modifying Traffic (3a)
Normally the server only sees what it receives from the client and has no way
of telling what produced the traffic. The game-client will presumably send
valid traffic the server understands, but valid traffic does not have to come
from the game-client. This traffic could be constructed to be valid or, as in
classic replay attacks, be a copy of “old” traffic sent previously. One simple
example is to find out what the client sends to the server when the player
does some tedious task, and then write a small program that send this traffic
again and again. This can then be expanded to generate from scratch more
and more of the original game-client’s commands, eventually making it an
implementation of the game-client.
One real-life example of this is an aimbot created by some students at
Stanford for the game Quake. StoogeBot, as they named it, behaves like a
proxy and sits between the client and the server. By observing and altering
traffic it’s capable of aiming and shooting the in-game weapons, relieving the
player from such tasks. Since it operates as a separate program there is no
modification of the original gameclient. [34] The client simply connects to
StoogeBot and StoogeBot connects to the server. Even though StoogeBot is
an old program the concept remains valid since there still is no way for the
server to distinguish between the original game-client and a proxy without
some sort of authentication.
Modifications to the traffic could also be small, such as changing an in-
teger that tells the server how much damage the player did in a fight.
3.6.2 Observing Traffic (3ai)
Instead of changing or inserting data in the traffic sent to the server (in-
tegrity), a cheater can just observe the traffic and read out information as
is passes from the server to the client (confidentiality). Although observing
traffic, in one way or another, is often a prerequisite to modifying it, just
simply observing can be easier to achieve.
Just because the server sends this information to the client does not
mean the player is suppose to see it, and extracting this information from
the network traffic can be an alternative to reading it out of memory or
otherwise hacking the game-client software.
Another possibility is to observe other players network traffic to gain
information and thus an unfair advantage in-game.
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Account information and other information not directly related to the
gameworld could leak this way.
3.6.3 Denial of Service (3aiv, 3b, 3c)
See section 3.1.3.
3.6.4 Combating Network Attacks
Most of these problems, except DOS attacks, can be countered by encrypting
and signing the network traffic. Unfortunately, encryption adds to the com-
plexity and uses some additional resources. Also the key have to be stored in
the game-client, making it retrievable. Having a unique key on each game-
client helps as it is then no longer possible read the traffic of other’s client. It
is also possible to try to hide the key on the client using software obfuscation
(section 3.5.5).
3.7 Abusing the Game Logic or Rules
Sometimes it can be possible to exploit the game itself, e.g. the rules or logic
of the game. Computer games, like other games, have rules, and breaking
those rules can be beneficial to the cheater. The type of attacks that fall into
this category are game-specific and it’s therefore difficult to give a complete
list of these problems. Some of these problems are non-technical in nature
and can be design flaws in the game, or problems
3.7.1 Collusion (4a)
Many competitive games, computerized or not, are “vulnerable” to collusion
between the players. It can be as a form of information exposure where
some players reveal secret information to each other, or other types of team-
work between players who ought to be competing. These players gains an
advantage over the honest players.
One type of information exposure can be seen in many first person shoot-
ing games where players, when killed, have to wait to re-spawn, i.e., get
back into the game. In some games waiting players are “spectators” and
can watch everything that is happening in the game, including, for example,
where other players are hiding. A player that is killed in-game can share
this information with another, active, player to give him or her an unfair
advantage. Being a virtual world with virtual identities, one person can join
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a game with multiple virtual identities at once5, without the help of another
player.
MMOs are less vulnerable to collusion than many other type of games
because teamwork is often encouraged. But teamwork outside the scope in-
tended by the developers can pose a problem. Thottbot6 gathers information
from a large amount of players of World of Warcraft and a few other games.
Players voluntary send in information about the gameworld and the site gath-
ers it all into a large database. The system is free and open to everyone, also
those who do not commit data, but it is still, in a sense, collusion. If the
information was only available to a group of players, it would more resemble
cheating.
Collusion is game specific and very hard to combat. The game itself has
to be designed in a way that does not reward unwanted cooperation too
much.
3.7.2 Score Hacking (4b)
Many games have scoring of some type where the player is rewarded for some
actions and punished for others. Depending on the implementation and game
rules, it can be possible to fool the scoring system. A common way is to quit
or disconnect the game when losing or otherwise being at a disadvantage. For
example, if the MMO player is punished for dying in-game, he can simply
disconnect if it is inevitable. The server can’t tell if the disconnect was on
purpose or an error as the gamer can “pull the plug” if necessary.
A real life example, taken from [23], is a weakness in the scoring system of
the StarCraft7 ladder competition. As player was awarded a point for winning
matches but not punished for losing matches, two players could collude and
play fake matches where they alternately lost to each other. This way both
players would win many matches and rise to the top of the ladder. This is
example exploits a weakness in the scoring and collusion between players,
neither of which are technical problems.
3.7.3 Bugs and Design Flaws (4c)
Design flaws and bugs in games can often be exploited by players who know
about them. Although the difference is not always clear-cut, bugs are typi-
5For example by running the game on two machines at the same time and joining the
same server
6http://thottbot.com/about
7StarCraft is a hugely popular real-time strategy game released by Blizzard in 1998.
See http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/games/sc/
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cally technical errors in the game such as glitches in the 3D world where walls
become transparent. As such, bugs could also be defined as a client-side (2a)
or server-side (1a) problems. Design flaws are typically more subtle and are
not necessarily technical, such as unintended consequences that arise when
players attempt actions not intended or tested by the developers. In role
playing games this can arise with spells. Since spells often can be “stacked”
or combined, and there are so many of them, bizarre combinations can lead
to bizarre results, sometimes giving the player a huge, some would say, unfair
advantage.
Due to the complexity of modern games, it is impossible to test every
possible combination of actions in-game, and both bugs and design flaws are
often discovered by the players after the game is released. Bugs are often
quite easy to fix once discovered, but design flaws can mean a major re-design
of the game to make it fair.
It is common for players to exploit bugs and design flaws, and such actions
are sometimes regarded as a part of the game. It can also be regarded as
cheating, even if it’s done without extra software or modifications to the
game.
[35]
3.8 Attack Graph for Multiplayer Games
Based on common literature and sections 3.2.3 and 3.1, an attack graph for
multiplayer games was created. Refer to figure 3.5 on page 39. Motivation
(starting points) are marked with gray
It would be useful with a weighted graph to easier see where the main
problems lie and what countermeasures would be most effective. Unfortu-
nately there is not enough data8.
8Although I have my own perceptions, the weights are only meaningful if they are
somewhat accurate, and preferably based on something more than intuition.
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Figure 3.5: Full attack graph for security problems in multiplayer games.
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Chapter 4
Potential for Protecting MMOs
with Trusted Computing
4.1 Overview of Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing, in the sense it is used here, is a loose term referring to
technology developed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). The Trusted
Computing Group is a consortium that was founded in 2003 by 14 companies
including AMD, HP, Intel, Microsoft, Sun, IBM and Sony. It is the successor
to the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, and it’s unclear what — if
anything — tells them apart from the original Alliance. They now describe
themselves as a standards group and have more than 100 members.
Trust defined Trust, as use by the TCG, means that a system or compo-
nent has the ability to break the security, but not necessarily that it should
be trusted, or, in other words, that it is trustworthy. [36, p. 31]
4.1.1 Overview of the Technology
The TPM Specifications
The TCG currently publish several specifications. The first, and arguably the
most important specification is the Trusted Platform Module specification,
from now on referred to as the TPM specification. The TPM specification
is now in version 1.2 and is fairly large and complex, covering the TPM,
its use in the platform and software and drivers. The TPM chip is most
commonly implemented as a hardware chip attached to the motherboard.
Although it is possible (and allowed, see [37, section 4.3]) to implement a
TPM in software, it would have to have the same level of tamper protection
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as a hardware based solution [37, section 4.3.3]. Since all TPM’s in practice
will be hardware chips, and software only solutions defy the point, I will refer
to TPM as a hardware chip or module.
The TPM Chip
The chip itself is also confusingly called a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
It describes the TPM, a simple hardware cryptoprocessor consisting of a small
CPU, memory (volatile and non-volatile) and crypto specific hardware.
The main advantage is the supposed difficulty of modifying hardware
compared to software. The TPM is not suppose to be secure against all
physical attacks, i.e., not tamper proof. But it is expected to have some
anti-tamper measurements to make modifications to the chip difficult. Still,
the main goal is to be secure against all sorts of software only tampering or
changes. Thus some operations are entirely self contained and not relying of
the trustworthiness of other parts or software. These operations should be
totally unaffected by software only attacks.
Rationale
As discussed in section 3.5 securing software can be a difficult task, especially
when the “attacker” has control over the system, as is the case when it comes
to computer games. In general terms, software, when broken, can not be
depended upon. To check if software is modified in unwanted ways is difficult
when no software can be trusted. An example is rootkits: malware that
hides its own presence by modifying the operation system and other software.
Detecting rootkits is difficult since the software usually used to check for its
existence can not be trusted to return a sincere answer. Having a hardware
chip that is untouchable by software creates something that is dependable,
even when software is not.
In theory, this neutral chip could be used to let the game server know
the truth about the game-client, for example, if the client software had been
modified. It could also be used for authenticating the client to the server and
vice versa, to secure network traffic and to hide secrets.
The most common threats today — like viruses and other malware — are
software only, and indeed has to be for easy propagation. Requiring hardware
tampering, however trivial, would be a major gain.
This is also one of the few technologies that are not entirely under the
users control, and this property sets Trusted Computing technologies aside
from most other solutions for software protection. Although TC technologies
do not operate in secret and the user has the ability to enable and disable
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features such as the TPM, one of the design goals of, e.g., the TPM specs is
to be able to assert the security state of a platform to another. The user can
deny this, but not, supposedly, deliver false information. [38, 37, 39, 40] This,
in a sense, lack of user control has been criticised (section 4.2), but there are
some scenarios where this property is desirable. If malware compromises a
machine the lack of a software override is generally a good thing as it keeps
the malware from taking total control of the platform. This way it can be de-
tected, at least by other systems. In this case, some sort of hardware override
could arguably be implemented without losing security. But made too conve-
nient, and social engineering could be used by malware to fool unsuspecting
users to disable their own security. There are at least two scenarios where
even a hardware override would break the security: usage controls such as
digital rights management and game-client security. Treating the user of his
or hers own computer as the “enemy” is understandably controversial, but
from our point of view when securing game-clients, the right thing to do.
Activating and Taking Ownership of the TPM
Before the TPM can be used for anything useful it has to be activated, or
initialized. This can be done by an administrator, for example in a coop-
eration where the computers are not owned by the users. Often the users
themselves will do this. When initializing the TPM one sets an owner secret
which will be used to control the TPM. There is a strong focus on the users
control over the TPM so physical access to the machine shall grant the power
to reset and re-initialize the TPM, creating a new owner. [38, 39, 40] One
way to prove physical presence is to require the user to enter the BIOS setup
utility to activate and take ownership of the TPM. Unfortunately the BIOS
setup utility is not something most users dabble with, so this will make it
somewhat difficult for users to activate and control the TPM.
4.1.2 Promises and Features
The TPM itself is becoming quite widespread REF, but there is still a lack of
software truly utilizing the TPM, in the sense that is uses it to do something
it could not do in software alone.
“One of the first design goals of TCG was to provide a trusted way to
measure and report on a platform’s environment [38, Ch.2]
This means it should be possible to remotely determine what software is
running on a computer, and if that software was modified.
Another design goal is secure storage for keys and other data. Data stored
this way should be protected by the TPM and secure agains all software only
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attacks. In a process calles “sealing” data is bound to a given “platform state”,
and only released by the TPM when the platform is in the given state. This
state is defined by PCR values (section 4.1.3).
4.1.3 Basic TPM Functions
The TPM have several components, some are for internal use only but most
can be used by outside software.
While the TPM uses a device driver and other software for many oper-
ations, some operations are executed within the TPM and thus contained
from the outside. This means that software and other devices should not be
able to affect the outcome, other than suppling the input.
TPM, both as a specification and as a hardware chip, has existed for some
time. Different vendors produce TPM modules and they should all adhere
to the specification.
Random Number Generator Random numbers are commonly used in
cryptographic operations such as key generation, but are hard to generate
in software only because of the deterministic nature of computers [41]. The
TPM has a hardware based random number generator that supposedly gen-
erate output that is more random than software only solutions. If this is
actually the case with todays TPM’s remain to be seen1.
SHA-1 Engine SHA-1 is a cryptographic hash function that produces a
160-bit digest from messages. The TPM is not a cryptographic accelerator
and the specification does not specify a minimum throughput for the SHA
engine [39]. Therefore SHA-1 engine is primarily for use early in the boot
process, before the full operating system is loaded. Higher level software will
default to use a software only implementation [38, Ch.7]. It should also be
noted that there are known problems with SHA-1. This is discussed in 4.5.
Symmetric Encryption Engine (for internal use) The TPM has an
symmetric encryption engine, but it is for internal use by the TPM only, i.e.,
it does not expose any symmetric cryptographic operations. For data that
does not leave the TPM designers use whatever algorithm they wish, but for
other use the Verman one-time pad using MGF1 is mandatory. AES can be
supported as an alternative.[39, 4.2.2.3]
1Or should we say researched. I was unable to find any research proving the effectiveness
of the RNG
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RSA Engine and Key Generation The TPM is capable of encrypting,
decrypting and signing using RSA with keys up to 2048 bits. It can also
generate new keypairs and store them internally, i.e., not exposing the private
key in the clear outside the TPM.
Pre-Installed Keys and certificates The TPM comes with several pre-
installed key pairs. Several certificates are “installed” in the TPM to attest
to its implementation. Manufacturers can ship TPM, and thus computers,
with more pre-installed certificates than the ones that are strictly necessary.
Pre-shared keys can be used to establish encrypted communications over an
insecure channel, but authentication depends on the other party’s ability to
validate the certificate. The certificates are signed by the manufacturer, who
thereby vouches for the TPM, that it is genuine and correctly implemented.
Key and Data Storage To keep production costs down the TPM has
little storage or memory. Fortunately, the encryption engines and the ability
to store keys internally means that the TPM can store large amounts of
keys and other data by encrypting it and moving it to the hard disk or
other storage device. Although the encryption makes it unreadable (gives
confidentiality), it does not stop someone from damaging or simply deleting
the encrypted data on disk (availability).
PCR Registers The TPM has several special register called Platform
Configuration Regisers (PCRs). By residing inside the TPM, the PCRs have
some special capabilities: They can not be read or changed by conventional
means (the TPM interface has to be used) and they can only be extended
or reset, not set to specific values. When a PCR is extended the old value
is concatenated with the new value, hashed with SHA-1, and stored in the
PCR. Most of the PCRs are only reset at TPM initialization (typically sys-
tem power-on) and can only be extended thereafter, and some can be reset
by a special CPU instructions at any time.
These PCR values can later be read from the TPM, and possibly signed
by the TPM itself using a key stored internally. By checking the signature
on the requested PCR values, the other part can be sure the values received
are unmodified and was the values stored in the TPM at the time of signing.
This process is often called remote attestation.
[37]
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4.2 Criticism
Trusted Computing and the Trusted Platform Module have received a good
deal of criticism and opposition. Some of the most prominent critics of
Trusted Computing have been Richard Stallman [42], Ross Anderson [43] and
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)[4]. Another critic of the original
TCPA (now the Trusted Computing Group) and Microsoft Palladium (now
the Next-Generation Secure Computing Base) was Lucky Green.[44]
They all deal with Trusted Computing using a static root of trust, as
explained in 4.3.
Most of this criticism seems to revolve around the users control over his
or hers own system.
4.2.1 DRM and Copy Protection
Ross Anderson believes that DRM (section 3.5) was the original motivation
for Trusted Computing and Stallman also say that “Hollywood and the record
companies” plan to use TC to enforce DRM.
Copy protection is similar. TC can be used to force people to pay for
their software.
Although they, or at least Anderson, don’t defend pirated software or
digital media, they fear that DRM will be used to take away freedoms that
customers have today, and that DRM and copy protection is the real reason
TC exists.
4.2.2 Vendor Lock-in
Anderson believes that Trusted Computing can be used to “lock” customers
to a specific company by. Both Anderson and Stallman uses Microsoft Word
as an example: if Word where to encrypt all the files using TC it would be
very hard for competing software to read the file, and breaking the encryption
might be illegal. He notes that this kind of blatant lock-in might be illegal,
but that there are other and more subtle strategies for making it harder to
switch to a competing product.
Anderson also believes that TC can destroy free2 and open source software
by making the source code useless. The source will be open, but the user
will be unable to use it without an “authorized machine” This, he believes,
will destroy the motivation for people to contribute to open source software,
and this is one of Microsoft’s goals. Stallman notes that TC could be used to
2free as in speech
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restrict what software a computer could run and that this “puts the existence
of free operating systems and free applications at risk”.
Although they do not comment on it, there are now some examples of
this kind of platform control where the vendor decides what software will run
on their platform. Example include Apple products such as the iPhone and
the upcoming iPad, and gaming consols such as Playstation 3 and Xbox 360.
The EFF article make yet another point: They argue that the inability of
third parties to tell what software you are using is almost always a benefit for
computer users. They use Samba, an alternative implementation of Microsoft
Windows filesharing3, as an example. Using Samba computers running other
operating systems can connect to Windows servers, or operate as a server for
Windows clients. If the Windows machine was able to tell if it was talking
to a non-Windows machine it might simply refuse to work or degrade its
performance.
4.2.3 Censorship
There also seems to be a fear that TC can be used for censorship by making
it possible to delete and retract documents and emails.
In early 2010 Amazon came under criticism for something quite similar
to this, although they did it without using TC technology. They remotely
deleted some e-books from the Kindle 4 devices of their customers. Ironically
at least one of the books in question was written by George Orwell, and some
reports claim that 1984 was one of them5.
4.2.4 Discussion
EFF seems balanced, recognizing that TC have both potential and pitfalls.
Ross and Stallman go pretty far in saying that the whole Trusted Computing
initiative is a scam to “make your computer obey them instead of you” and
stop copying of digital media and software.
The counter argument to some of this criticism is that the TPM is “opt
in” that is, turned off by default, and that physical presence will grant the
power to reset or turn off the TPM. While this is true, as Green ([44]) note:
3Technically an implementation of the SMB and CIFS network protocols. Their website
is http://www.samba.org/
4Kindle is a hand-held e-book reader sold by Amazon
5http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/
18amazon.html, http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/
some-e-books-are-more-equal-than-others/
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the TPM can turn out to be as voluntary as putting gasoline in your car; no
one is forcing you to do it, just don’t expect anything to work if you don’t.
However, it is not true that the user have to trust the TCG and its
members. The specifications are open and public. They do, however, have
to trust that the chip is made according to the specification and does not
implement extra evil features. The EFF article comments on this. The TPM
specifications require the implementation to be certified.
Most users already trust the hardware manufacturers as they have no way
to check their computer parts, e.g., BIOS and firmware, but still use it.
The argument that Trusted Computing will help create unbeatable DRM
and copy protection might be accurate, but miss the target. The consumers
solution to intrusive DRM and copy protection is not to continually break it,
but to stop paying for it.
The EFF purpose a change to Trusted Computing where the user can
override remote attestation and lie to other systems if they are physically
present. They claim this will fix what they call problems with TC. While
this might be true, requiring users to use “approved” software — which they
deem a bad thing — is exactly what we want when it comes to securing
MMOs and other multiplayer games. The EFF recognize this, and even note
that their change will render TC useless in securing networked games.
In the end, we have to consider the benefits and potential problems of
trusted computing. To do this effectively greater understanding of the tech-
nology is needed.
4.3 Trusted Boot, Secure Boot and Static Root
of Trust
One of the initial goals of TC was to make it possible to measure and report
on a computers environment. This would help better control what software
the computer is running in order to prevent unwanted software and unwanted
modifications to the platform. This can be done either by stopping unwanted
software from running, or just recording the fact that it is so local and remote
software can make “meaningful” decisions.
As with many terms used in Trusted Computing, these features and ideas
have many different names in different sources, and the terms can be over-
lapping and even contradictory. Trusted Boot and Secure Boot can refer to
just the pre-OS boot process or the whole system with OS and applications.
Either way, the goal is to secure the boot process in order to have a secure
base to “build” the OS and applications on. Securing the boot alone is not
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enough. The OS must implement its own security features to keep control
over the platform and stop unwanted software from undermining it, but it
can use the TPM and other TC technologies to do so. This is the classical
way of building a secure and thrustworthy execution environment using TC,
and is sometimes referred to as static root of trust.
Balfe and Mohammed discuss how Trusted Computing can be used to se-
cure multiplayer games in Final Fantasy — Securing On-Line Gaming with
Trusted Computing [3]. They do not, however describe in detail how this
technology works, or how it could be implemented. They also limit them-
selves to secure or trusted boot, which is an a priori requirement for all their
purposed solutions.
Trusted Boot vs Secure Boot
The difference between “trusted boot” and “secure boot” is, according to [38,
Ch.2], that secure boot will not allow the system to boot into an untrusted
state, presumably by stopping the boot process whenever it finds something
amiss. Trusted boot on the other hand just records what was booted so that
it can be reported later. This does not stop unwanted or modified software
in the boot process, but reports the fact that it’s present. Trusted boot
seems more pragmatic since it never stops the user from booting his system,
but allows him to prove that he booted in a certain way. Trusted boot is
sometimes called authenticated boot.
Chain of Trust
The TCG uses the transitive relation on trust, meaning that if part A trusts
part B, and part B trusts part C, then part A trusts part C. Trusted and
Secure boot uses this to build a “Chain of Trust” by starting with a trusted
starting point and extending the trust to other parts deemed trustworthy.
Benefits
By controlling the system from the startup and never letting go of this control
it’s possible to control what software is running on the system.
In recent years there have been several proof-of-concept rootkits devel-
oped for PC firmware, such as the BIOS and expansion cards. This has not
been a huge threat in the wild, probably because there are lower hanging
fruit, but the concept is valid. Such rootkits escape the most common detec-
tion techniques and can survive operation system upgrades and re-installs.
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It can be hard to implement a rootkit in firmware since it runs so early in the
boot process and none of the high level api’s are available, and there is no
other programs running to interfere with. But a rootkit could modify con-
tent on disk, such as the OS or other software, and set it self up in memory.
Also, some firmware is executed after the OS has loaded, for example ACPI
code in the BIOS and some legacy features in the video card. John Heasman
have shown examples of both these techniques[45]. Other possibilities are
to modify the MBR, VBR, boot sector or bootloader on the disk drive [45].
Correctly working secure boot or trusted boot would stop or detect these
attacks.
4.3.1 How it Works
Trusted Computing covers many different hardware platforms. Implementa-
tion of trusted boot is platform specific and what will be described here is
for personal computers6.
The success of Trusted Boot and Secure Boot depends on a few abilities:
1. A known secure starting point or state. Typically, this will be the state
where the computer is turned off and no software is running.
2. A way to measure or check the next part of the boot cycle. The PC
platform boot is a multi-stage procedure, and each stage has to be
measured or checked before it is handed control over the CPU and
other hardware.
3. A way to store the measured values. For trusted boot, these values have
to be stored in such a way that they can not be modified by subsequent
stages in the boot process. This is because control can be handed to
stages found to be “bad” or modified, as the goal is not necessarily to
stop those from executing but to know that they are not trustworthy.
For secure boot, these values have to be stored on forehand in order
for the check to happen at this time and not later.
4. For trusted boot, a way to read those values out, either for local or
remote software. Integrity of this data are the main concern not avail-
ability. This means that “bad” parts or code might be able to stop those
values from being read, but it should not be able to fake or change them
in any way.
6IBM PC compatible hardware
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5. Some knowledge of “good” or correct values. Reading and reporting
these values does not accomplish anything unless we know what they
are “suppose” to be.
We will now look at how these prerequisites can be fulfilled with trusted
computing.
Secure starting state The idea is that the computer is in a known and
secure state before it is powered on. Unless the platform has been modified,
it is known what will happen when it is turned on: the CPU in a IBM
compatible PC will start executing the BIOS from a hard-wired address. In
a TC system, the control is first given to the core root of trust measurement
(CRTM). The CRTM should preferably be a part of (located inside) the TPM
chip, but the specifications allow it to be physically separate, and todays
motherboards have the CRTM as a part of the BIOS. Even if the CRTM is
located outside the TPM chip it is trusted and thus it should not be easy to
modify the CTRM itself, or to bypass it or the TPM during boot. Thus if the
CRTM is part of the BIOS, this initial BIOS code must be immutable and not
reflashable like the rest of the BIOS normally is [38, ch.6]. Although physical
modifications are not entirely preventable, the TPM specifications do specify
that the manufacturer have to implement tampering countermeasures. How
well the CRTM is protected in todays implementations is an open question.
According to Kauer[46] at least one computer they tested did not follow the
TPM specification and protect the BIOS and CRTM (section 4.5).
Measuring When the CRTM gets control it is its job is to measure the
rest of the BIOS and hand control over to it. “Measuring” is most easily
implemented as a SHA-1 hash of the binary, but it is possible to devise other
ways of measuring code and data, and the measuring in each step does not
have to be the same. It is then the job of the BIOS to measure the firmware
located on expantion cards and other hardware, and the MBR. Then the
MBR measures the bootloader, the bootloader the OS kernel, the kernel the
rest of the OS. At this point it is the OS’s job to measure any applications
before they are executed. It’s debatable if this is part of trusted and secure
boot, but the boot lays the foundation for the OS.
Storing Measurements For trusted boot, where these measured values
are to be used later, the values have to be stored after each step, in a way
unchangeable to the subsequent steps. Or, more precisely, it has to be stored
in a way that makes change apparent to everyone. This is exactly what the
PCR’s in the TPM accomplishes, see 4.1.3. The properties of a cryptographic
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hash function like SHA-1 (but see 4.5 for a caveat) means that it is very
hard to find a value that will hash to a given value, and therefore for a
piece of software to “undo” the PCR to a good state, even if the software
knows what this good state is. To do this, it would be necessary to reset
the PCR and extend it with the good values until the correct PCR value
is obtained. Therefore the PCRs used in trusted boot can not be restet
after the TPM is initialized. One way of thinking about this is that we are
storing the executables themselves, as the hash is one-way and as good as
storing the binaries themselves. In addition a log or history of what has been
measured and the value obtained for each PCR can be stored outside the
TPM, for example on the disk drive. The history file does not have to be
secure against tampering because the PCR’s and the values in the history
file have to match, so altering just the history file accomplishes nothing.
For secure boot, it is not necessary to store the measured values as part
of the boot.
Reading and reporting PCR Values The PCR values are stored in the
TPM and can be read out with low or high level TPM API’s.
For secure boot, this is enough since software can trust itself; was it not
“secure”, the boot process should not have reached it. Reporting PCR values
to another system (third party) is not necessary for secure boot, but might
be desirable after boot to prove to other parties that the system was booted
securely.
The PCR values are stored in the TPM and can therefore be signed by
the TPM itself and sent out. The signature should be generated by a key
internal to the TPM. How this is perceived to be done in TC is discussed
later in this chapter.
For trusted boot, checking the local client is different because there is no
known environment to fetch the PCR values in a secure manner. Even if they
are signed by the TPM, there is no obvious way of checking the signature
locally; if the system have been attacked we can not trust the software to
check the signature. A workaround is to not read of the PCR values at all,
but let the TPM handle the comparison.
Locally comparing to known good values When using secure boot
the comparison is done at boot time: each part of the boot process is mea-
sured and compared before executing. This means that this low level code
(real mode for most of it) must implement code to both hash (or otherwise
measure) code and talk to the TPM. This could probably be implemented
in the CRTM or BIOS and shared with the other code. A problem with
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Figure 4.1: Usage of the PCRs in a PC trusted boot. How code executed
during the boot process is extended into different PCRs. From [38, ch.2].
this approach is that the same chain of trust that will stop tampering with
the boot process will stop upgrading. A solution is to switch to public key
cryptography as early as possible, as seen with the Xbox 360 (section 4.3.2).
In a process called sealing, the TPM can “lock” data to one or more
PCR’s. The data will only be released, or available for use by the TPM,
if the PCR(s) have the correct values. The correct PCR values are defined
when the sealing is done. For trusted boot, a way to check if the local system
has been booted in a trusted way is to seal a secret to a PCR and then the
software can try to use/get this secret. This could for example be a key for
symmetric encryption. If we are able to get the key and decrypt the data we
know the PCR(s) have a previously defined good value [38, ch.2]. Microsoft
Bitlocker uses a variation of this: the volume containing the operation system
is encrypted with a symmetric key and the key is sealed to “good” PCR values.
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One way to learn the “good” values is to take the values recorded at first
boot, or another point in time, as correct. Bitocker stores these values when
Bitlocker is first enabled.
Remotely comparing to known good values For trusted boot, the his-
tory created when booting contains all the steps (extends) that has happened
to each PCR. When the PCR values are reported to another system along
with the history file, the other system (e.g., a game server) can check that it
only contains approved software. If it does, the PCR values can be checked
against a database of correct values, or the other system can do the same
“extends” steps on the correct software and compare the answer to the PCR
values received.
A combination of local checking and remote checking is probably desir-
able. If the OS could attest that it loaded securely, it could just send over a
list of software executed since boot. Or better yet, do this check locally as
well, since sending a list of software can be seen as a privacy issue7.
4.3.2 Examples of Secure Boot and Trusted Boot
Microsoft Bitlocker
The Microsoft technology collectively known as Bitlocker is a system for drive
encryption which also, in some modes, builds a chain of trust to help secure
the data. Refer to figure 4.2.
Bitlocker uses a combination of trusted and secure boot. Windows will
not load if there is a problem during boot, but the boot will not halt at the
first sign of trouble. A true trusted boot setup would let the OS load but
record the fact that the boot was not secure. Also, only the boot process
up and until the boot manager is checked, once the boot manager unseals
the symmetric key, Windows loads normally and have the responsibility of
keeping the system secure.[47]
A problem with the Bitlocker approach is that it stores values from first
boot after its enabled as good, and seals the key in the TPM with those PCR
values. An attacker (boot rootkit) can therefore reset the good values and
break the system.
On the one hand, an attacker with enough privileges to install a boot
rootkit from software could also turn Bitlocker off or steal the data from the
running system, so this is not too serious. On the other hand, this ruins
Bitlocker for our purpose since a Bitlocker secure boot can not guarantee the
integrity of Windows.
7Although Blizzard seems to get a away with something similar with the Warden
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Also, they seemingly forgot to include expansion cards (such as PCI,
PCIe, AGP) in the boot process check. If this is actually the case, or if it’s
just an oversight in the documentation, is unknown. Heasman[45] explain
how code from expansion cards sometimes are loaded into RAM and execute
by the BIOS.
Another potential problem, although unrelated to our purpose, is the
leakage of the symmetric key from RAM on a running system. MacIver
mentioned this problem in 2006 [47]8. [49]
The Microsoft Xbox
The original Xbox video game console, was produced by Microsoft and re-
leased in 2001. Built upon commodity PC hardware with some modifications,
and ran a modified Microsoft Windows operating system.
Pirated games is an issue with console (as well as pc) games, and cheating
8This has been a known problem for some time, and later the infamous “Cold Boot
attack” brought this issue more attention [48]
Figure 4.2: A simplified view of Microsoft Bitlocker operation. (1) When the
system starts the CPU starts executing the code in the CRTM. The CRTM
extends a PCR in the TPM with the MRB. (2), (3) This pattern continues
through the different stages of the boot. (4) The boot manager will unseal
the symmetric key needed to decrypt the disk content. The TPM will only
release the key if the PCRs have the correct value, i.e., the values stored when
Bitlocker was first enabled. If successful, the boot manager can decrypt the
disk and hand execution over to the boot loader, which will load the Kernel.
[47].
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and malware is a potential problem on gaming consols as well. Also, Mi-
crosoft earns money selling games and reportedly lost money on each Xbox
they sold in the beginning. Therefore they would like to avoid that a large
number of sold Xbox consols were used as cheap PCs instead of gaming
consoles [50]. Xbox features a secure boot like boot in order to “lock” the
platform down and disallow any unofficial games or software to run. This
booting procedure of the Xbox uses the same “chain of trust” principle as
the trusted boot used in trusted computing. Since the Xbox is so similar
to “normal” PC hardware, the solution created by Microsoft is especially
interesting.
The Xbox does not use a TPM, but build their chain of trust by other
means. Refer to figure 4.3 on page 57.
1. The root of trust in the Xbox is a 512-byte secret boot block that is
hard coded into the southbridge chip. The Xbox boots from this code
but tries to hide this fact with decoy boot code.
This decoy boot block is located in a flash ROM chip and is presum-
ably included to obscure the booting process and hide the real boot
code in the southbridge, and therefore contains a “halfway reasonable
looking decryption and initialization code” [51]. Another possibility is
that the decoy boot code was not meant to be a decoy at all but was
unintentionally left in the flash ROM.
After some system initialization the secret boot block reads the kernel
bootloader from the non-volatile flash ROM chip. The kernel boot-
loader, encrypted with the RC4 cipher, is decrypted. The key is stored
in the boot block. After decryption, the boot block will try to verify
the kernel bootloader by looking for a 32-bit number in the decrypted
content. [50]
This check makes it possible, intentionally or not, to update the kernel
bootloader.
2. The boot block jumps to the kernel bootloader. The kernel bootloader,
now decrypted and verified, performs some more system initialization.
The kernel bootloader, using a key stored in the bootloader itself, de-
crypts and verifies the kernel, stored in the same non-volatile flash
ROM. This verification is necessary because the flash ROM, although
non-volatile, is re-flashable and should not be trusted.
3. Once the kernel is loaded it is its job to decrypt and load necessary
libraries and execute games from DVD discs and other applications
stored on the internal disk drive. All games and applications must be
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Figure 4.3: Overview of the Xbox security features and chain of trust: (1)
The Xbox boots from a secret boot block in the southbridge, which decrypts
and jumps to a RC4 encrypted kernel bootloader which (2) decrypts and
jumps to the stripped down RSA encrypted Windows 2000 kernel. (3) The
kernel executes games and other binaries, and loads necessary libraries, if the
are signed with correct RSA keys.
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signed. The appropriate keys for signature checking and decrypting are
located within the kernel.
4. Games can load custom data, such as saved games from the disk drive
or USB storage. Saved games let the player return to a place in the
game without having to start from scratch each time.
The security of the system comes from the immutable initial bootcode in
the southbridge. It is not easy to replace the chip, overwrite the code in it
or override execution of this code.
Even if the flash ROM that stores the kernel is reflashable and thus not
secure, it can not be modified without the initial boot block detecting this
and refuse to execute it. The chain of trust is further build by using RSA
encryption and signatures, which should be checked on all code before it’s
executed.
Several flaws in the design and implementation of the Xbox “trusted boot”
made it vulnerable to attacks.
• Since the secret boot block is contained in the southbridge, it has to
communicate with the CPU over a bus. With a boot block of only
512-bytes and commodity parts, any sort of encryption on the bus is
difficult. But the bus is high-speed and they presumably assumed it
would be very difficult to tap. Unfortunately for Microsoft, Huang built
custom hardware and read the bus and thus the content of the secret
boot block [51].
One solution to this problem is to move the boot block and make it
a part of the CPU, but this would mean stock CPUs could not have
been used. Another solution could be to include a CPU with the code
running the en- and decryption, which, to some degree9, is the case
with the TPM.
• The check used by the boot block to verify the kernel bootloader is
simple and anyone with knowledge of the key, the “magic” number and
the cipher (RC4) can create their own bootloader. Huang theorises
that this check is so simple because of the limited storage space in
the southbridge [51] while Domke and Steil points out that the RC5
cipher used in the decoy boot block behaves differently10[50]. It is also
9The TPM internal RSA encryption is available for use by software, but the TPM is not
a crypto processor and will be slow compared to the main CPU in most cases. Therefore,
a developer might opt to do all encryption for his software without the TPM.
10They seem to belive that the use of the blockcipher RC5 in place of the streamcipher
RC4 would fix this problem, but this is not evident.
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possible that this was designed this way to make it possible to update
the kernel bootloader.
If one can trick the boot block to load another kernel bootloader the
chain of trust breaks and the whole security crumbles. It is the kernel
bootloader’s job to verify the integrity of the kernel, and if the kernel
bootloader can be modified or replaced, the kernel can be modified
or replaced. This, in turn, makes it possible to load another operating
system or run a modified kernel that, for example, does not authenticate
games.
This attack hinges on the ability to read the secret boot block contain-
ing the key.
• Over time several arcane features and quirks of the PC platform and
hardware used have been utilized to break the chain of trust created in
the Xbox. One of them, the Intel “bug” exploits a difference between
Intel and AMD CPU’s: The Xbox was originally suppose to ship with
CPU’s from AMD but Intel was chosen as the vendor late in the devel-
oping process. The Xbox expects the CPU to throw an exception when
reading through end of memory, but the Intel processors does not work
this way and continues reading at the start of memory. This makes it
possible to get the Xbox to execute custom, unchecked code. [50]
• The DVD drive checks if discs are authentic and is trusted by the
kernel. But the firmware is not protected and can be overwritten with
a version that confirms all discs [52].
• A software only attack is also possible. The chain of trust is bro-
ken in many games because they load saved games without check-
ing/measuring them correctly first, and have a bug in the load routine.
Also, these saved games can be data created at run-time by the game
software, and the game software has to be able to sign saved games.
This leads to the private key being kept in the game software [50]. Even
if the games are encrypted and the chain of trust is intact, it would be
hard to keep this secret key out of RAM, where it could be read barring
other security measures.
A TPM could help mitigate this problem by signing and checking the
saved games. To sign using the TPM requires the ability to run custom
code on the system, which is prohibited as long as the chain of trust is
not broken.
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Games are complex pices of software - even if the chain of trust holds
up to this point - expecting them to be bug free is arguably naive. All
games run in kernel mode and full access to the system is given to the
game, and whoever can successfully exploit one.
[50]
Domke and Steil argue the Xbox was rushed to marked and the security
system was devised by people without any real security expertise [50]. This
could explain some of the failures made with the Xbox, but not all the failures
are obvious, and these can be taken as a hint to the difficulty of creating a
chain of trust using commodity hardware.
The Microsoft Xbox 360
The Xbox 360 have several differences from the first Xbox. While the original
was built with commodity hardware, the Xbox 360 utilizes components not
normally found in personal computers. It runs on a customized IBM 64-bit
PowerPC CPU with three cores. Although it does use common technologies
such as PCI and SATA, several legacy technologies have been dropped.
To increase the security several extensions have been included on the CPU
die. Refer to figure 4.4 on page 60.
Figure 4.4: A simplified view of the Xbox “Xenon” CPU, based on [52] and
[53]. Marked in black are the parts added for the Xbox 360: A random
number generator, eFuses, ROM (32KB), SRAM (64KB) and Logic for en-
and decryption as well as hashing page tables.
Several changes to the design was made from the first Xbox:
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• The ROM containing the boot code and 64 KB of RAM in now included
on the CPU die (fig. 4.4). This removes the need to send data from
the boot block over a bus, and the ROM is large enough to hold the
necessary code to do “real” checking of the next part of the boot process.
The internal RAM makes it possible for the CPU to store limited
amounts of data internally instead of in system RAM. This is used
during the first stages of booting, when encrypted ram is not yet us-
able.
The bus-taping attack used against the first Xbox will not work simply
because the boot code does not travel over a bus anymore.
• EFuses, an IBM technology, have also been added to the CPU. There
are 768 eFuses and each one represents one bit: it’s either logically (and
physically?) “burned” or not. Both “burning” an eFuse and reading its
state can be done from software. Restoring an eFuse can not be done,
at least not from software.
The eFuses are used to “burn” a unique (for each Xbox) serial into the
CPU which is also used as a key for symmetric encryption.
They are also used by some software to stop downgrading: When exe-
cuting the software will check an eFuse to see if it’s allowed to run. An
update can “burn” this eFuse to stop the old version from running.
• To stop important data from “leaking” from system RAM, all code, and
the data deemed sensitive is encrypted at runtime before it leaves the
CPU. The key used for this is randomly generated at boot.
Encryption does not stop the destruction of data. Domke and Steil [54]
uses a blacklist stored in RAM as an example. The blacklist would be
needed for revocation, but could easily be destroyed by flipping a bit
in the encrypted data. Although changing encrypted data will yield
unpredictable decrypted data, it can still be harmful. Especially if the
encrypted data is code and it’s possible to modify small portions. A
simple example would be modifying the target of a jump operation. The
execution would jump to a “random” address, but with some patience
and luck it could be made to jump to an address space controlled by
the attacker.
Important segments, up to 1 MB, can therefore be hashed as well. The
1MB limit is due to the hash values being stored in the small CPU
RAM.
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The hashing, en- and decryption is implemented in (besides?) the L2
cache one the CPU die.
• Games are now running under a hypervisor to control and limit what
they can do. Most of the hardware is accessible for the games directly.
The hypervisor reserves the right to do security sensitive operations
such as cryptography, but make these operations available to other
software with syscalls. This means that the system no longer trust
games fully, even if it should not be possible to modify games in any
way or run other custom code.
As mentioned, games are complex and might contain exploitable bugs.
The use of the hypervios means that even successfully exploited soft-
ware can not “roam free” on the system.
The hypervisor is running with the highest privileges and is, reportedly,
small and well written [54].
• WˆX (NX) is also implemented in the hypervisor. Each page can be
either writable or executable to make it harder to exploit software bugs
such as buffer overflows: Code injected can not be executed. Theres no
hardware support, the hypervisor has the full responsibility of enforcing
these checks, and only the hypervisor can mark a page executable.
Booting:
1. Booting starts with the boot code stored in the CPU ROM. It will
decrypt and check the next stage bootloader from a flash ROM chip
outside the CPU. This boot code can not be updated since it’s stored
in the CPU ROM. A flaw here would be disastrous.
2. This loader checks an eFuse to see if it has been revoked, sets up the
external (system) RAM, and the en- and decryption using a fresh ran-
dom key. It will then decrypt, check and load the next stage loader
into external RAM (encrypted).
This is the first code which checks to see if itself has been revoked,
through an eFuse. This sounds bad, since it relies on software checking
itself, but actually works as long as the check is before the exploit in
the program.
Generally, the reason for revoking code is to stop downgrading. When
a bug is found in a piece of software, that software can be fixed and
upgraded. In the Xbox 360 all software, except the first boot block,
are stored on the flash ROM chip and thus can be upgraded through
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flashing this chip. If the Xbox will actually flash this chip itself or if an
upgrade only affects new units, is unknown. In this case, downgrading
would work by re-flashing the flash ROM with its old (pre-update)
content after an upgrade. Since this old content is indeed signed by the
correct keys, it would be allowed, if it where not for the eFuse checks.
After a downgrade the boot loader will count patches included on the
flash ROM, and compare the number to a special batch of eFuses. There
will be fewer patches than the number of patch eFuses “blown” and it
will halt execution. This assumes the code with the bug is executed
after the patch check, if the bug comes before the check it is possible
to hijack the program and thwart the check.
The system halts execution on security errors. In trusted computing it
would be useful to be able to continue to load the operating system, but
flag the fact that it is no longer “secure” and trustworthy, i.e., trusted
boot. In the Xbox 360 this is not possible since the CPU can not sign
arbitrary date like the TPM can, just memory pages. This is needed
to be able to respond to a challenge from a remote system with the
status of this flag, signed by the CPU itself. The Xbox 360 also lacks
a storage facility like the PCRs to store the “we have been hacked” flag
in an unchangeable manner. “Blowing” an eFuse would work, but they
are not restored at reboot, so a glitch in the boot could render the
system permanently “hacket” to the outside world.
3. This kernel loader checks, decrypts and extracts the kernel into en-
crypted system RAM. The kernel is never changed or updated, but the
kernel loader can apply patches (from flash ROM) if available.
4. As with the first Xbox, the kernel (with supporting libraries) is respon-
sible for checking games and other software before launching them.
This is done with RSA keys and signatures.
Even games and software found to be “good” are not given full control
over the platform since the hypervisor runs with higher privileges.
Although a better design the first Xbox, the 360 is not perfect, and a few
successful attacks have been launched against it ([54, 52]) :
• There was a bug in the hypervisor, the code that runs with the highest
privileges.
• The CPU serial burned into eFuses is used a symmetric key for some
operations. By connecting to the correct bus a timing attack on mem-
compare, which is used to compare the values, is possible. Since the
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serial is unique, this is not a class attack and has to be done on each
Xbox.
• Games does not sign game data, in itself not a problem, but a special
kind of “game data” called “shader code” is actually executed. It should
therefore be signed but, is not.
Other questions also arise:
• The Xbox 360 security very much rests on the CPU and its ability
to keep secrets. The CPU die is often regarded as untouchable. Is
it? Presumably the CPU was not built with anti-tampering in mind.
The small size might render disassembly “impossible” but other attack
vectors are available. Attacks have been seen on other chips where
the working condition of the chip (such as voltage or temperature) is
altered to make it behave in ways it was not meant to.
• At least one person claim to be able to disable eFuses by disconnecting
pins on the CPU11.
4.3.3 Challenges
Although sometimes overlooked in TC literature, we face many challenges
when creating and maintaining a trusted boot. The challenge discussed here
are specific to creating a chain of trust with trusted or secure boot. A more
general discussion about TC can be found in section 4.5, and problems di-
rectly related to MMOs are discussed in 4.6.1.
Needed software changes Trusted boot and secure boot require more
than just a TPM. Depending on the implementation it also requires changes
to some of, or all of, the stages in the boot process. This includes the BIOS,
MBR, VBR, expansion cards, boot loaders and operation system itself.
Knowing the right answer When a secure boot solution is attempted,
the firmware and software included must know the correct values a priori,
which hampers the upgrading of individual parts of the system.
Trusted boot, instead of secure boot, allows the user to use the system
in whatever way he or she wants and only worry about the security status
when using TC enabled software. Even so, for trusted boot to become useful
in normal settings12, it has to be user-friendly and not “complain” too often.
11See: http://dwl.xbox-scene.com/tutorial/XBOX360cpu15data.pdf
12Settings where security is not a high priority.
64
The most promising solution is to sign the PCR values and log with a
non-migratable TPM key13 and ship them off to another system for veri-
fication. This system would then have to know the correct values for the
hardware (firmware really) and software versions used. Since PCs are so di-
verse, gathering the required information will be tough. Fortunately, gaming
systems a are probably a little more congruent than most systems. Also,
Microsoft already gathers vast amounts of information about drivers in their
driver signing program. All kernel-mode drivers in 64-bit versions of Win-
dows Vista and Windows 7 have to be signed by Microsoft [55].
The software could ship with its own measurement (e.g., hashes) signed
by a trusted party. This would require some infrastructure, but would mean
that the software itself could deliver the correct values, reliving the recipient
of having to keep a huge database over correct values for different software
versions.
Creating a foolproof chain of trust Everything has to be accounted
for. The process has to include everything involved in any way with the boot
process. If anything is forgotten, as seemingly happened with expansion
cards in Bitlocker, unmeasured code can be executed. In addition, software
is often complex and creating a foolproof chain of trust often relies on the
integrity of all the software in the chain. Also, platform features and quirks
used in unintended ways can break the security. The original Xbox is a good
example of these problems, as it suffered from both software bugs and failures
in hardware. The problem will get much worse with general computing, due
to all the different configurations that has to be supported.
In 2007 Kauer found problems with all the three TPM enhanced boot-
loaders tested ([46]). They where all LILO or GRUB based, and suffered
from faults in the implementation or faults in the design, such as loading
files twice: once for checking and once for execution.
There is no easy fix for these problems, but standardisation and scrutiny
of hardware, firmware and software will help.
When the attacker can pick and choose hardware and software, as in our
case, one loophole in the whole system is enough.
Further changes in hardware and software are probably needed.
Extending the Chain of Trust Although it is often implied in TC lit-
erature that securing the boot process will fix all security problems, in re-
ality, this is not enough. The chain of trust has to be extended beyond the
13More precisely a key pair. Being a non-migratable, the private key can not leave the
TPM, “proving” that data signed with this key was signed internally in the TPM
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boot process and into the operating system and programs, and it has to be
maintained. This is done by always controlling which software runs on the
platform. The security of an applications depends on the security of all soft-
ware executed before it [56]. The reason for this is that the TPM is a passive
chip and can not measure software on its own. Therefore the OS have to be
extended with TPM support to either stop unwanted software or record what
applications it runs. Although the application itself could measure (extend)
itself into a PCR, this valued could not be trusted since the application itself
is not trusted.
Even with OS support, a bug in one of the trusted programs (bound
to happen) can break the chain of trust and allow for modification of that
program or execution of unchecked and unmeasured code on the platform.
It can also be argued that todays operating systems and applications are
so complex that stating facts about their security and integrity is almost
impossible. This is one of the arguments used to push Dynamic Root of
Trust technologies [56]. See section 4.4.
Time of check, time of use Measuring software before it is loaded means
there is a time gap between the software check (found safe) and the software
use. Software is also attested to at run-time, but was checked at load-time.
Several critics point to this as a problem ([38]) since, e.g., a vulnerability in
the software could be exploited, and the running software would no longer
be secure. This is of course true, as the trusted boot itself does nothing to
check software after it is loaded. But the real problem is actually to measure
complex software. If the software is vulnerable it is not secure, should not
be trusted, and in a secure boot, not loaded at all.
User Limitations If the user wants trusted or secure boot, he or she will
be limited to approved hardware and software, meaning all kinds of custom,
outdated or uncommon hardware and software will present problems.
There is a valid concern that going down this road will be exploited by
certain vendors and lead to unwanted limitations on the user. See section
4.2.
Unintended use of legacy hardware and software Todays trusted and
secure boot relies on common hardware and software that was not built with
this in mind. Generally, it is not a good idea to rely on features for security
if they where not built with security in mind.
In a way, we are “abusing” the boot process and legacy software for doing
something it was not meant to do. All the use of legacy hardware does not
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help this, as one has to have a complete understanding of all the quirks. An
example of the problems this can lead to is described by Brossard. He found
that pre-boot authentication often was implemented in a insecure way:
Many pre-boot authentication software programmers are not aware
of the inner workings of the BIOS interruptions they use in their
products, which can lead them to wrongly assume the BIOS han-
dles the keyboard in a secure way by itself. [57]
The first Xbox can be seen as a case in point for these difficulties. One
advantage trusted boot has over the Xbox is that the goal is not to lock down
the platform. It does not matter that the boot process can be hijacked as
long as it is evident that the boot was not secure.
Lack of Memory Encryption Trusted boot and secure boot are only
intended to measure and control what software can be executed. Thus trusted
boot alone, without other TC technologies, can leave the system vulnerable
to even “simple” hardware tampering techniques such as DMA attacks. DMA
attacks abuse the fact that DMA14 enabled devices can read from and write to
the memory directly, independently of the CPU [58]. Also it might be possible
to extract information directly from physical memory, either on a running
system or shortly after it has been shut down [47]. This problem recently got
more attention when the cold-boot attacks where proven practically possible
[48].
Further protection such as memory encryption will often be necessary to
keep the platform secure also after boot.
Privacy Concerns In a chain of trust all loaded during boot and hencefor-
ward play a part in the overall security of the system. Therefore, all software
loaded need to be verified by a remote party for them to verify the trusted
boot, even if they are only interested in one application. This, of course, can
be a privacy concern. [56]
4.4 Dynamic Root of Trust Measurement
Since building a chain of trust from boot have proven to be challenging in
practice, a few somewhat newer techniques have emerged. Dynamic root of
trust measurements (DRTM) promises to bring the benefits of trusted boot
without the hassle of controlling everything from the boot and forward. It is
14Direct memory access
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a fundamentally different way of approaching the problem, and it does not
give use the same platform control as a successful trusted boot, but is easier
to implement.
Where static root of trust approaches, such as trusted boot and secure
boot, build a chain of trust by measuring all code executed from the initial
system start, dynamic root of trust approaches does not care about the boot
process or what other code is running. Instead, these solutions strive to
create a known-good state (root of trust) without requiring a reboot. In this
known-good state, a hypervisor or other software is started. A dynamic root
of trust can be created at any time after the system has booted, or during
the late stages of the boot process such as in the boot loader.
This is rather impossible using legacy PC hardware as both running pro-
grams and previously executed code can impact the platform and interfere
with the sensitive code. To create a known-good stat that is not affected by
the current status of the platform, new hardware extensions beyond the TPM
are needed. A dynamic root of trust is created using new CPU instructions,
with support from other architecture changes and the TPM. Both AMD and
Intel have created CPUs with support for dynamic root of trust, and these
are are already availability in some off-the-shelf hardware [59]. AMD’s so-
lution is called Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) and Intel’s solution is called
Trusted Execution Technology (TXT). These technologies are different and
not compatible, but for our purposes they can often be regarded as one be-
cause they both implement the same functionality [59]. They both offer
hardware extensions such as new CPU instructions to create a dynamic root
of trust (SKINIT and senter) and protection from DMA for selected portions
of memory [46, 56].
Trusted Computing Base The collection of software that is trusted is
sometimes referred to as Trusted Computing Base (TCB). In trusted boot
and secure boot solutions this includes the BIOS, boot loader, operating
system, drivers and other applications. Since it is believed that the number
of bugs is proportional to the lines of source code in software ([60, 38]),
minimizing he TCB is a way to limit the number of critical flaws in trusted
code. Dynamic roots of trust excludes all other software from the TCB by
breaking all ties to previously launched, as well as currently running, code.
By not depending on any other software, we do not depend on their security
properties either, and bugs in those programs will not affect the security of
code in the TCB. But the TCB must be entirely self-sufficient and can not
utilize other software such as common libraries or operating system functions.
Code, if available from a secure location, can be included as a part of the
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TCB, at the cost of expanding it. Keeping the TCB self-contained can be a
challenge, but means that all this other code no longer have to be trusted.
4.4.1 The Open Secure Loader (OSLO)
After identifying several problems in the then-current static root of trust
implementations (sections 4.3.3 and 4.5), Kauer goes on to describe a se-
cure bootloader (OSLO) based on the AMD dynamic root of trust CPU
instruction (SKINIT) [46]. The goal is to shorten the chain of trust and
thus minimize the TCB. This is accomplished by creating a dynamic root
of trust before executing the operating system. This removes the BIOS,
firmware and other bootloaders from the TCB. However, this does nothing
to solve the problem of measuring complex software. OSLO only guaranties
the state of the platform at the point when the OS is launched. The operat-
ing system itself and all applications that are executed have to be measured
and trusted. Thus, OSLO creates a trusted boot or secure boot similarly to
the static root of trust approaches. But instead of beginning (“anchoring”)
this chain-of-trust at the first code executed at system startup (CRTM), a
dynamic root of trust is created by the bootloader.
4.4.2 Flicker
Figure 4.5: How code is executed under Flicker, from [56]. On the left, a
traditional computer executing an application with a sensitive piece of code
(S, or PAL). On the right, the application utilizes Flicker to run this sensitive
code. The shaded areas represent the components that’s trusted. On the left:
Hardware, OS and applications with high privileges, and on the right: only
Flicker itself and some of the hardware components.
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Unlike many other DRTM solutions, Flicker ([61, 59, 56]) is not intended
to launch an operation system (OSLO) or a hypervisor ([62], TrustVisor)
securely; instead, it takes a different approach to the problem and focus on
further minimizing the TCB. Flicker lets a developer run a piece of code
contained and independent from other software on the system, including
the BIOS, firmware, bootloaders, OS and applications. This piece of code,
which they call Piece of Application Logic (PAL), is not intended to be an
application. Rather the PAL should be a small, security sensitive part of an
applications, for example, the part handling cryptography and secret keys.
Every time the PAL is executed, Flicker builds a dynamic root of trust and
suspends all other software. Thus, building a static chain-of-trust (4.3) is
no longer necessary, and the TCB consist only of Flicker and the code to
be executed Refer to figure 4.5. After the PAL has ran, Flicker will remove
sensitive data from memory before the control is returned to the calling
application.
Flicker also attests to a remote system that the code ran under Flicker
and what the input and output of that code “block” (the PAL) was. As
with all TC attestation, this must be done using the PCR values and TPM
keys and certificates.. To secure the code block from the other software all
ties to other code must be broken. On current hardware the OS and other
applications must be suspended while the code block runs. This, obviously,
impacts the performance of the whole system and can create other problems.
Especially IO can be problematic if the code runs for too long. The PAL
also has to be self-sufficient, it can not depend on any other code. Not only
because it is the only code who actually runs, but more importantly, code
used or otherwise depended upon is implicitly trusted. This means that the
PAL can not, for example, make use of the standard Windows API or other
libraries on the computer. Although standard code can be included in the
PAL itself, this, in a way, defies the point since there is no reason to trust
this code.
Flicker have some interesting properties. It relies on the TPM for measur-
ing itself and the PAL’s, and attesting these measurements to other systems.
It also relies, as all DRTM solutions, on the CPU and chipset’s ability to iso-
late the code executed under these new CPU instructions. Flicker requires
a TPM and a CPU with the new security instructions, but no changes to
the operating system or other software. The authors have created proof-of-
concept code for Linux [59].
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4.4.3 TrustVisor
TrustVisor ([60]) is a special-purpose hypervisor that represent the state of
the art in both dynamic root of trust solutions and trusted computing15.
Similarities to Flicker TrustVisor is inspired by Flicker (4.4.2, [59, 61]),
and just as in Flicker, the goal is to be able to run security sensitive parts
of an application (PAL) measured and isolated from other software. As with
Flicker the TCB is kept small by not trusting the operation system or any
applications except for TrustVisor itself (Fig. 4.6).
TrustVisor aims to have a much smaller performance overhead by execut-
ing most operations on the main CPU instead of in the TPM. Also, where
Flicker have to create a new DRTM (SKINIT or senter instruction) for each
invocation of a PAL, TrustVisor only creates one dynamic root of trust.
Figure 4.6: Trust in TrustVisor, from [60]. The security of the PAL depends
on the TCB, which consists of the PAL itself, the µTPM and the rest of
TrustVisor. It also depends on the hardware TPM and DRTM feature of the
CPU and chipset (section 4.4), but not other hardware or software.
Launching TrustVisor
TrustVisor is a hypervisor and is started before the operating system. It
runs with the highest privileges (ring 0) and can therefore control memory-
mapping and hide memory from the OS and applications. Somewhat simpli-
fied, the bootloader will use DRTM (AMD’s SVM in the reference implemen-
tation) to enable hardware memory protection, extend (measure) TrustVisor
into a PCR and launch it. Thus, the DRTM operation creates a known-
good starting point and the TPM will hold a hash of the TrustVisor code
executed. The operating system (Linux in their implementation) is run as a
15The paper is scheduled to be presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy
in May 2010.
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virtual machine. The goal of this is not to control or check the OS, but to
have enough privileges to hide data from the OS and run code that it can
not “tamper” with.
Running PALs
Registering Code is identified as a PAL when it is registered as such with
TrustVisor through a application-level interface. What is registered is “a list
of function entry points, and input and output parameter formats”. Presum-
ably, this means C code.
Invoking The functions that are part of the PAL can now be invoked as
normal. When they are, the call traps to TrustVisor which sets up the secure
execution environment. The PAL can only access its own memory. When the
function is finished, TrustVisor again gets control and makes the function’s
return parameters available to the calling, untrusted, application. Also, the
memory pages containing the PAL are marked as inaccessible.
Figure 4.7: The PAL (and its functions) is registered with TrustVisor and
executed in isolation from the operating system and other applications. The
µTPM is the only interface exposed by TrustVisor to the PAL, but the real
TPM is available for use if necessary.
Micro TPM Each PAL gets its own micro TPM (µTPM), a software-only
implementation of some TPM features. The µTPM is a part of TrustVisor
and therefore trusted. In order to keep the TCB small, the only TPM-like
functions implemented are:
1. µPCRs. PCRs implemented in software.
72
2. Extend operation (HV_Extend) to measure code and data and store
the result in the µPCRs
3. HV_GetRand for obtaining random data
4. Sealing and unsealing operations (HV_Seal and HV_unseal) for sealing
data to µPCR values.
5. Quote operation (HV_Quote) to attest to the values of the µPCRs.
This is done by signing the µPCR values with a key dedicated to this
particular µTPM, which, in turn, is signed by a key in the real TPM.
These functions does not use the real TPM directly, but the main CPU. They
therefore, presumably, run much faster16.
Attestation and Trust Establishment
TrusVisor can attest to other systems that some code (the PAL) was run in an
isolated execution environment. This is a two-step process: first TrustVisor
must be attested to by the TPM, and then the PAL can be attested to by
the µTPM.
Attesting TrustVisor The TPM signs the PCRs relevant for dynamic
root of trust. This covers a measurement of TrustVisor itself, and the fact
that DRTM was used correctly to launch it. The recipient must be familiar
with TrustVisor to make sense of these values.
Attesting the PAL Before a PAL is executed it is extended into a µPCR.
In adittion, the PAL can choose to extend other PCRs, e.g., with input
and output parameters. With trust in TrustVisor the µTPM’s HV_Quote
operation can be used to sign these µPCR values and send them, together
with the attestation from the real TPM, to the receiver.
4.5 General Problems and Challenges with Trusted
Computing
These general problems and challenges with Trusted Computing technology.
Problems specific to trusted boot and secure boot can be found in section
16The TPM is a low-cost chip and much less advanced than the CPU. The authors
evaluation of TrustVisor confirms this [60].
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4.3.3, and the challenges faced when implementing TC are discussed in sec-
tion 4.6.
Reliance on Trusted Boot
Many TPM functions and TC use cases seem to, often implicit, require
trusted boot. For most operations the TPM requires support in software
such as the driver or the OS, which almost always means this software has
to be trusted. In earlier (non-DRTM) literature trusted boot is seemingly
taken for granted, as this get little focus in the trusted computing books and
documentation. This is one example where the TC effort seems very little
pragmatic and constantly looking too far into the future to be useful today.
Non-Compliant and Faulty TPM Implementations
In [46] Kauer discuss several problems found in TPM implementations. The
first problem is a PCR reset attack against old (v. 1.1) TPM’s. The second
problem is faults in the then-current secure bootloaders (4.3.3). The last
problem is the ability to overwrite the BIOS, including the CRTM, which
is the static root of trust in the system. This is a violation of the specifi-
cation which states the core root of trust must be at least somewhat pro-
tected against tampering. By overwriting the CRTM, an attacker can load
a “hacked” bootloader and lie to the system by extending the correct PCR
with the value of a correct bootloader.
In 2006 Sadeghi et al. tested many TPM implementations and found
that several did not meet the specification [63]. This is worrisome because
there is suppose to be a procedure in place for evaluation and certification
of implementations [37, section 5].
Problems Related to Certificates
One area that seems largely forgotten, but still is crucial if we want to do any-
thing useful with trusted computing, is the need for some sort of Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI). Mentioned only briefly in TCG documentation (such
as [37, section 6.4]), there might be a common consensus that developing
PKI’s are a separate and well known problem that will be solved elsewhere.
Much of what happens with the TPM depends on the ability of the re-
ceiver to check that incoming data was signed by an actual, correctly imple-
mented, TPM. To do this, the recipient must have access to the certificate
that vouched for the TPM’s. A full-fledged PKI is probably not necessary,
the problem can be solved by other means such as pre-shared keys and cer-
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tificates. Indeed, this is how the similar problem is often solved when SSL is
used, such as in web browsers.
The use of SHA-1
As Schneier discussed as early as 2005, SHA-1 is no longer considered a secure
hash function, since collisions can be found quicker than a full brute-force
attack [64]. In practice this is might not a problem for TPM use yet, as
finding collisions is still very difficult. Unfortunately, these attacks have a
habit of getting better with time.
Breakable Physical Security
In early 2010 Christopher Tarnovsky presented a talk[65] at the Blackhat
conference in Washington, D.C. where he explained how he was able to break
several Infinion security chips, among them their TPM. He stated that he
used 6 months to accomplish this. His achievement was that he was able to
extract secret keys from the devices that should never be accessible outside
the device. Breaking one or more chips in this way does only break the
security of those chips and does not affect the security of other chips or TPM
in general, it is not a class break. It does, however, show how these chips
resisted physical attacks, and it is reasonable to believe that once he has been
able to break one, he will break identical chips faster in the future.
Huang believes that “if you ship your secrets in your hardware, it is a good
assumption that the users will eventually — and perhaps quickly — know
your secrets” [51, Section 4].
While the TPM only moves the problem, from attacking software to at-
tacking hardware, this is a great improvement. Even though Hung is proba-
bly correct when stating that secrets in hardware are not totally secure, his
own work on attacking the Xbox goes a long way towards proving the point
that attacks on hardware are involved. Also, software attacks are often very
easy to replicate. Even simple hardware attacks require some work.
75
4.6 Securing Massively Multiplayer Games with
Trusted Computing
4.6.1 Using Trusted Boot and Secure Boot
The benefit of trusted boot and secure boot is the level of platform control
it provides. Both Microsoft the Microsoft Xbox and Xbox 360 are examples
of this, albeit the later a more successful one. Successful trusted boot solves
many of the security problems currently seen in MMOs and other multiplayer
games. Controlling or knowing what software is running on a system, would
stop most of the known client-side game-hacking techniques. This is because
the most common techniques involve either modifying or replacing the game-
client, installed software and libraries or altering the operating system itself.
Trusted and secure boot is defined here as including the operating sys-
tem, meaning that the it will continue the “chain-of-trust” started at boot.
Arguably, this is outside the scope of the secure (or trusted) boot as it must
be done by the OS, but the secure boot is a necessary prerequisite. Securing
the boot process only, as Bitlocker currently does, it not enough to solve any
problems. See section 4.3.3, “extending the chain of trust”.
A modified attack graph is given in fig. 4.8. Motivation (starting points)
are marked with gray, and problems solved with trusted boot and secure boot
are grayed out. “Sell cheating programs” and problems related to password
guessing are partially grayed out, since they will be severely hampered.
This section refers to the taxonomy in section 3.2.3.
Client-side Attacks Stopped
These attacks described in chapter 3 are either completely stopped or severely
hampered by trusted and secure boot. Correctly working attestation would
make software modification impossible, or rather, enable the server to tell
modified clients from honest ones. Thus fixing the biggest security problem
facing multiplayer games today.
Modifying the Game in Memory or on Disk (2bi, 2biiA, 2biiB)
Section 3.5.2 describes the problem of game-client modification. With full
control over the platform, the Xbox 360 does not allow any unknown games
to run, and further stop modifications to the games and the operating system.
Although the hardware is different, the same concept applies for trusted com-
puting: with control over the platform, unwanted software can be detected
or stopped from running. When the “chain-of-trust” is continued into the
operating system, it will stop these attacks. Either, the OS can refuse to
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load a modified game-client, or remote attestation will let the game server
know that the client was modified. The server could refuse to serve clients
that did not have a “proven” secure environment. But a better idea would
probably be to treat them differently, by, for example, more actively monitor
their actions in the game, or isolate these clients in separate shards.
Using the Layer Below (2biB, 2biiC, 2biiD) Section 3.5.3 defines
this problem, which is similar to the previous one. The operating system
itself is protected by the trusted or secure boot, and can therefore not be
modified. The game-client itself can not be modified to load a custom driver.
Run-time modification falls into the domain of OS security, but a trusted
boot or a secure boot enables the OS to protect itself in a way not otherwise
possible, because it can not be modified or replaced.
Automated playing (2b, 2c, 2d) Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.4 define bots
and automated play. Although controlling the interface can be done with
hardware, it is more difficult than doing the same in software. Therefore
“botting” and automated play typically require modifications to the game or
operating system (DLL hooking). Since trusted boot boot and secure boot
solves these problems, automated play becomes extremely difficult.
Automated play by abusing network traffic is covered later.
Other Attacks Stopped
Secure network traffic (3a) Since the platform and the software running
can be trusted, it can also keep secrets. This enables encryption and integrity
checking (MAC and public key signing) witch can fix these network related
problems (3a), albeit with some overhead. Currently, keeping the key secure
on the untrusted client is not possible. With secure storage the key can be
sealed to the “valid” platform status. In addition, attestation could ensure
that if “illegal” software was loaded to, e.g, dump the key from memory, the
server would know and could discard this key.
Signing or encrypting the traffic is not enough to stop “botting” done by
replaying network traffic. Fortunately, the game-client can now be trusted to
include a nounce or timestamp. Also, generating valid network traffic from
“scratch” is no longer possible beacuse it requires a valid key.
Help keep software and firmware up-to-date (1a, 1c, 2a) Vulner-
abilities in software persists, but with trusted boot the servers can attest to
each other, and to the client, that they where running the latest version of
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the software. Similarly, the server can force the game-client to upgrade to
the latest version. Although it is possible to check software versions without
trusted boot, it relies on the software responding “truthfully”.
Vulnerable hardware (or firmware) on the servers can also be detected.
Stop account thefts (1d, 1e) Authentication problems are discussed in
3.1.4. Using the unique identity of the TPM and the encryption included, a
new authentication scheme could be devised that did not require the server
to store usernames and passwords. Authentication could, for example, be a
long shared secret the TPM on the client would release only when given the
correct authentication info and in a secure state.
Also, since malware is not possible, and the network traffic can be en-
crypted, usernames and passwords are much more secure.
Other Benefits
Fewer checks on the server, more logic on the client The fact that
the sever suddenly can start trusting the client, is a major gain. Today,
developers are faced with the difficulty that most operations are most effi-
ciently done at the client-side, but the game-client can not be trusted to keep
secrets and do fair and impartial operations. Operations therefore often have
to be executed at the server since it is the only trusted part, using precious
server-side resources and adding lag to the equation. Developers are forced
to try to strike a balance between security and performance. If the client
can be trusted, more and more operations can be oﬄoaded to the client, and
the server can conserve resources today used to check client-side calculations,
and otherwise test the clients integrity. Extending the client this way can
also save bandwidth, which is a huge expense when running game servers.
Also, when functions are moved to the client-side, waiting for the server is
not necessary. This can increase the general performance of the game-client.
New features With trust in the client, new functions not possible today
could be developed. Functions and features currently deemed too security
sensitive to be on the client, but also too resource intensive to be implemented
on the server, could now be implemented on the client. When the game-client
is in a secure state (which the server can check) it can seal its own secret
data to this state using the TPM. This data is only be accessible as long as
the software has not been tampered with, stopping them from leaking.
Peer-to-peer gaming This also means that peer-to-peer gaming would
become easier to implement. Today the lack of trust in other peers make it
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difficult. Peer-to-peer MMOs would cut down the bandwidth requirements
on the server-side even more, and spare the developers this great expense.
Remaining Issues
It is clear that trusted boot would not solve all the problems. Indeed, it
only removes two top-level “branches” from the attack graph (4.8. This is,
however, misleading. The attack graph is not weighted (section 3.8), but
most security problems are related to client-side modification [12]. These are
all solved with trusted boot.
Also, another major problem at the moment is account stealing. Current
forms of account stealing use malware to either steal the account information
or act as a man-in-the-middle. These problems are also solved with trusted
boot.
Therefore I believe that trusted boot would solve the most serious prob-
lems.
Challenges
Unfortunately, there are many challenges that must be overcome before this
can be used to secure multiplayer games. These are problems directly related
to games, more general problems are given in section 4.3.3. Generally, trusted
boot and secure boot can not be used to secure multiplayer games today, even
when (or if) the hardware becomes widespread17.
Lack of platform control Although the solutions taken by the console
manufactures are interesting in their own right, they do not directly relate
to computer gaming since the consoles are specialised systems controlled by
the manufacturers to do one thing and one thing only. General computer
systems are not controlled by the game developers and have to be flexible
enough to be able to handle any task.
Trusted boot involve the whole system in a way that makes it very difficult
for the game manufacturer alone implement. Both hardware and operating
system support (section 4.3.3) are needed. It would be technically possible
for the game developer, or more likely a third party, to develop their own
“operating system” to use with games. This software could then support
trusted boot or secure boot, and not be “at the mercy” of outside software
updates. But, given the complexity of modern operating systems for general
17Although TPM modules are no longer rare, they are far from pervasive. The trusted
computing group have believed for a long time that TPMs will “soon” be in every computer
and mobile device. When, if ever, this will happen is impossible to predict.
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purpose hardware, it it very unlikely that this would be a viable option. To
make the matter worse, such an operating system would have to support the
latest and greatest in 3D graphics and sound.
Also the OS have to take care not to run any software which can be
exploited. On one hand, this seems almost impossible in a general purpose
computing environment. Even if all needed software is pre-approved and
signed, therefore trusted, one bug in one program can break the security.
The chain of trust is just as secure as its weakest link. On the other hand,
Microsoft do already have code signing for drivers, and Windows would not
have to stop “unwanted” programs from running, which would put an even
greater burden on the user, but only inform the TPM (by extending, or
ruining, a PCR) that it has happened. One way to mitigate the problem is
to take a lesson from the Xbox 360 design and use better privilege separation
to stop the bug from affecting the whole system. It will fall into the hands
of the OS to secure itself from the software it executes. The trusted or
secure boot will keep the OS secure by checking it on startup, and then
TPM features and other TC technologies can be utilized by the OS.
Therefore for trusted boot to be successfully used to secure games on the
PC platform, this must be implemented by the operating system vendor, in
most cases Microsoft, and the hardware manufacturers.
Fortunately many of the security challenge online games face are similar
to more common software security challenges. Changes to the platform moti-
vated by those problems will help secure games as well. The most promising
happenings in this regard is Microsoft Bitlocker and the extended control
they have implemented over drivers and kernel modules in the newer 64-bit
versions of Windows. Although not enough, they might be a outlook of what
is to come. Also, new CPU instructions have been added to both Intel and
AMD CPUs, as discussed in 4.4.
Knowing the right answer Knowing the correct values to measurements
is huge challenge (section 4.3.3). The approach used by Microsoft Bitlocker is
to store the values at a given point in time, and later using these for reference.
This approach is useless for our purpose because it makes it possible for the
user of the platform to decide what the correct values are.
4.6.2 Using Dynamic Root of Trust
Dynamic root of trust is a more diverse technology than the static root of
trust solutions trusted boot and secure boot. For our use, solutions that
launch the operating system (OSLO) or a general purpose hypervisor are
not useful. The reason for this is that they shorten the chain-of-trust, but
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little else. This means that most of the problems described in sections 4.3.3
and 4.6.1 persist. OSLO can help launch the operating system securely, but
the challenge of extending the chain-of-trust is the same. The problems when
securing multiplayer games does not currently lie in the boot process.
Utilizing Flicker and TrustVisor
Flicker and TrustVisor can not deliver the same platform control trusted boot
and secure boot can. Instead, these technologies can be regarded as building
blocks for enhancing the security of applications. Therefore they must be
built into the game-client and no general solution will fit all games. Even so,
some observations and recommendations can be made.
Privilege separation As McCune et al. note in [60]:
This design makes it the responsibility of application developers
to identify the security-sensitive regions of their programs and
group sets of functions into one or more PALs and untrusted
portions. Essentially developers are required to perform privilege-
separation
By separating the security sensitive portions of the game-client and run-
ning them under Flicker or TrustVisor, software modification (2b) would
become less useful. What portions of the game-client, exactly, this is will
vary from game to game. But generally, it will be code that handles the
state of the gameworld and other secret information.
Similarly, automated playing using software (2c) becomes much more
difficult if the game-client can protect the data structures typically read and
changed when creating a bot.
Bugs in the software (1a, 2a) become less of a problem because a bug in
the untrusted code can not give access to the PALs.
The major challenge in using Flicker will be to isolate code blocks (PAL’s)
that are both self-sufficient and small enough. Even with small PAL’s, the
performance impact might be too severe for resource intensive games. But
this, of course, depends on the PAL and how often it has to run. In [59]
McCune et al. develop a rootkit detector and find that executing it under
Flicker takes approximately 1 second. The performance impact of using
TrustVisor is much smaller, less than 7% in common cases, according to the
authors ([60]). Unfortunately, some code that handles sensitive information,
such as the gameworld state, is typically executed constantly.
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Reference monitor Using TrustVisor it should be possible to develop a
kind of reference monitor that would run and handle, e.g., all communica-
tion with the server. Such a “reference monitor” would keep a symmetric
encryption key secret during runtime (the PALs memory pages can not be
read from other software), and between runs using the sealing function of the
µTPM. When the game-client would like to send or receive data from the
server, it must go through this code to get it en- or decrypted. This would
fix the network related problems (3a, 3d), except for DOS attacks.
The reference monitor could also be a client-side implementation of checks
currently executed on the server, as a shared secret between the server and
the reference monitor can make sure it can not be bypassed. This will save
resources on the server-side and possibly enable more sophisticated checks.
This method could also possibly be used to enhance the authentication
(1d,1e). Instead of just sending the username and password to the server for
verification, a “black box” function could handle the authentication. It is not
clear exactly how this would work. More research is needed.
Game-client checker Just as the rootkit detector McCune et al. develop
using Flicker ([59]), a game-client “checker” could run infrequently, to mea-
sure the game-client and do other security checks. It would then be possible
to attest to the server that this code actually ran, ran securely, and what
the results were. The problem with this approach is that we again are using
software to try to check or measure other software. It will be possible for,
e.g., a modified game-client to “revert” back to normal behavior and hide
itself before the secure code runs. McCune et al. argue convincingly that
Flicker can guarantee, and remotely attest to, the execution of their rootkit
detector. They do not, however, explain how a fool-proof rootkit detector
would work. Supposedly, a rootkit (or game hack) could conceal itself before
the PAL is ran, or hide in code not checked by the PAL. [61, 59]
Problems and Challenges
Some problems — other than the aforementioned runtime overhead and priv-
ilege separation challenges — surface.
Dynamic root of trust solutions do not require any modification of the
operation system or platform, but they do require both a TPM and either
AMD SVM or Intel TXT (section 4.4). Although processors motherboards
with Intel TXT and AMD SVM are available off-the-shelf, they are far from
pervasive. Hopefully, the relative ease of implementing some of these solu-
tions, and backing from Intel and AMD, will mean that these technologies
will become widespread. Time will tell.
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Also, it is not clear how hard it is to attack the DRTM on the hardware
level. DMA attacks are prevented, but how difficult is it to read the RAM
using other methods? Although forcing hardware attacks, however simple,
is an achievement; knowing how much protection these technologies provide
is important.
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Figure 4.8: Modified version of 3.5.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
The security problems related to Massively Multiplayer Online Games, and
games in general, are many and diverse. This thesis have described these
games and detailed their security problems. A state of the art overview of
these problems based on current literature was given. A new taxonomy was
developed, together with an attack-graph, to better understand the problems.
Common motivational factors and attacks where identified and described.
Trusted Computing technologies where researched, and how they can help
solve the aforementioned problems where discussed.
Conclusion The classic trusted computing technologies, known as trusted
boot and secure boot, would solve the major security issues. But due to the
diversity of PC hardware and software, implementing this is a challenge yet
to be completed. The game developers can not implement this alone, as it
requires changes to the operating system and, possibly, hardware.
Re-designing the operating system most commonly used for gaming, Mi-
crosoft Windows, to fit this security model is no small feat, and can not be
expected in the short-term. However, Microsoft, with Bitlocker, has taken
some steps to homogenize PC hardware and implement trusted boot. Un-
fortunately, this does not extend into the operating system. Until this is
implemented in Windows these technologies can be ignored.
The newer, dynamic root of trust based, technologies have great potential.
Technologies such as Flicker and TrustVisor can be implemented in the game-
clients without modifications to the operating system or hardware. This
makes these technologies much more viable. Although they do not give the
same level of control over the platform as trusted boot and secure boot would,
they do ultimately have their root of trust in the hardware TPM. Therefore
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they can attest to the trustworthiness of the system in a way not possible
with software only solutions.
The hardware used, the TPM and CPU security extensions, are available
but not, by far, in all gaming systems. They possibly will be, but promises of
pervasive TPM chips have been made, and broken, many times since Trusted
Computing was first purposed.
For any Trusted Computing technology to be useful, a few underlying
problems must be solved. The most serious of which is probably the challenge
of distributing certificates securely, as it is a prerequisite of all dynamic root
of trust solutions.
Increased trust in the game-client would change the way Massively Mul-
tiplayer Online Games, and multiplayer games in general, are implemented,
and would let the developers create features not possible today. This includes
peer-to-peer gaming, which would be a major overhaul of the whole gaming
architecture.
Future Work At the moment, TrustVisor looks like the most interesting
solution. The project is still at the research stage, and further investigation
into its properties and how it can be used is necessary. Although a prototype
is implemented in Linux there is no Windows support for either Flicker or
TrustVisor. Interesteing future work would be to port TrustVisor and Flicker
to Microsoft Windows. Also, using TrustVisor to implement a trusted client
in an open source game, such as Bzflag1, could be challenging and interesting
assignment.
1http://bzflag.org/
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